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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

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EDITORIAL NOTES

A FEW months ago one of the good friends of Crozer Theological Seminary remarked to President Franklin: "Crozer stands for reality in religion." The phrase instantly appealed to the faculty as appropriate to the aims and efforts of the Seminary. To rid religion of all that is unnecessary and unworthy, and to preach a gospel that shall plumb to the depths of life is our aspiration. We desire to graduate men who will have a real scale of values, and will lead their people to put first things first. We want to stand now and always for reality in religion.

The symposium which was presented in the July issue of THE CROZER QUARTERLY was inspired by this phrase, each contributor attempting to indicate its significance for one aspect of Christian thought and experience.

"Reality in Religion" was also chosen as a caption for the Commencement program on May 26, 1937. THE CROZER QUARTERLY is happy in being permitted to present to its readers in this issue the text of the addresses delivered at that time. The Commencement address was delivered by Dr. William Ernest Hocking, Alford Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, on "Reality in Christian History." President Franklin's address to the graduating class was a definite challenge to maintain reality in their Christian ministry. In the afternoon a second convocation was addressed by Dr. Halford Edward Luccock, Professor of Homiletics in Yale Divinity School on "The Reality of Christian Experience." This address was followed by another from Dr. Edwin McNeill Poteat, Jr., Minister of the Pullen Memorial Baptist Church, Raleigh, North Carolina, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Seminary, on "The Reality of God as Discovered in Service to Man." The annual meeting of the Alumni Association of the Seminary was held in the evening of the same day, and at that time President-Emeritus Milton G. Evans delivered the address on "Reality in Christian Ethics." These addresses are all reproduced in this issue.

An additional contribution appears from the pen of the late Dr. S. J. Theodore, Professor of Philosophy in the Madras Christian College, the subject of whose paper "Mysticism and Reality" is in harmony with the general theme.

REALITY IN CHRISTIAN HISTORY

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING
Alford Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University

A FEW years ago there gathered in my house in Cambridge twelve or fifteen Chinese students. They were students of mathematics, of economics, of philosophy, of engineering. But they were all interested in one thing as visitors from abroad: What is this thing that we call Western civilization and what has made it? The discussion turned on this question: What has made Western civilization? Now these boys had all been studying history, in Harvard, in M. I. T., and in other colleges around the Boston area, and they had gathered no clear answer to this question. They had gained an impression more or less vague that it was science and technology that had made us what we are; and they had read enough of the history of Europe to know that there had been an era in which Europe had been dominated by the Church, and that there had been a great revolt—a "Renaissance," which included a breaking away from Christianity, and to infer that all we call specifically modern had dated from that revolt against Christianity.

They were pretty much in accord about what this modern civilization was, as they saw it through Chinese eyes (and there are no better eyes through which to see Western civilization than Chinese eyes); and this I may summarize in three characteristics:

First, the character just mentioned, the development of science and technology aided by scientific method, exploring the secrets of nature, and making discovery a business. The most amazing thing in the field of technological triumph is the fact that there is a statistical probability that the problems we put to scientific research can be solved.

The second characteristic is that we live in a world which is dominated by belief in individual human rights. That is a very different thing from saying that we live in a world which is dominated by law. Every civilization has law, but law is in the interest of the community. Law and order go together. Naturally every government must have law, but that is much different from saying that every government has a concern for human rights. When you say that a man has rights, you say that there is something about him that the law itself has to respect and protect—something that may be the main business of law. To these Chinese students the extraordinary thing about American civilization was that every man felt that he had rights which the State was bound to respect, and that our civilization was built around that idea.

The third characteristic was our aggressive attack upon evil and every kind of inconvenience that we experience. In the older civilization of Asia there are the ordinary evils of life: poverty, sickness, political evils. But the disposition throughout Asia has been that of enduring evil, making the best of a bad thing and not supposing that it ought to be changed. Here in the West every bad thing is a challenge to us.

These, then, were the three traits of modernity: science and technology, human rights, and aggressiveness in our attitude toward evil. Now, what has made these characteristics of Western civilization? Why is it, for example, that science has gained its method and its momentum solely in the Western world? Why not in China or India, so much ahead of us in observation and in mathematics? As we examine what these men had been learning from their historians, they had a most remarkable variety of causes to propose. It was the climate and the racial ingredients that had made Europe. It was the variety of people in a small space. Then there was the feeling that Europe had been blessed by natural resources and that the combination of the stimulating, temperate climate, the strong racial vigor, the variety of human kind and the natural resources account for all these things that are peculiar to us. What struck me was that not one of those Chinese students had any idea that Christianity had a part in the creation of the specifically modern form of civilization.

* * *

Now let us look at the matter with our own eyes. What things constitute the actual working stuff of history? What is it that makes history? We begin with the most obvious factors: There are the armies, the navies, the big men. There are always decisive battles of the world. This historian is going to deal with those, and so he should. But when we think of the armies, the navies, the economic problems and the great men, we realize that there is something else behind these. The continent of Asia has its armies and navies, its populations, and its great men, but the Western world does not at present fear Asia as a military rival. Why? Because of our gift of organization, and because of our capacity for putting into terms of military use the economic and racial. Isaiah Bowman, dealing with the remarkable culture of Arabia, states his belief in the capacities of the Arab people; he believes that they are people of great genius; but, he said, even if the materials were there, there is not enough knowledge or technical skill in all of Arabia to build one battleship. Except for Japan, the same must be said for all Asia. There

is evidently something behind these powers which is necessary to give them effectiveness.

Is it perhaps economic mastery? There is an influential conception of history according to which the dominant factors in human history have been man's necessities. The first business of any civilization is to provide for the lives of its members. Consequently, each civilization is driven to adjust itself to the modes of production at any time available. And these modes of production not only determine how men earn their living; they determine the ideals of right and property, the ideals of the family—yes, the ideals of right and wrong and the conceptions of religion itself—so that the whole of the civilization depends upon the economic factors.

I think the economic interpretation of history has suffered with the coming of new understanding. Let me mention one illustration. We are made conscious in America, by our government and other means, of our national poverty. We sometimes do not believe it exists: but if it is pointed out to us, it becomes at once a matter for concerted public action. But now how about Asia? There is no poverty in the United States that can compare with the poverty of India or China. In these two lands alone you have seven or eight hundred million people, nearly half of the population of the entire world. And of those I expect that it is not far wrong to say that six hundred millions are in poverty. And what happens? Nothing! For centuries, probably for millennia poverty has existed in Asia without producing any effect whatever. The economic factor is not the history-making factor by itself. It does not become operative until, first, people become conscious of poverty, and second, until they become convinced that something can be changed. The *attitude of the man* is what makes poverty an economic force. Economic forces are nothing by themselves.

What then are the real forces of history? History is made of *individual decisions.* We all know that Cæsar at one time crossed the Rubicon, and this fact goes down in history as an important, epoch-making fact. But what is it about this fact that we really want to know? We should like to know Cæsar's motives: and if we knew what his consciousness was at the time he made his momentous decision, we should know the history of that event; and until we are admitted into the inner secret of that decision we do not really know more than the shell of what happened. The real elements of history are just those elusive things which no recorder of history can ever discover.

As we inquire into this inner region, and ask what it is, in general, that constitutes human decisions, we shall have to say something about

ideals, because men's decisions are determined or limited by the ideas they have. It is quite impossible to consider some things, because the idea is not there just as it would have been impossible for Alexander to consider a parliamentary government, or for Napoleon to consider a system of European railroads. But an idea is not all that is necessary. The real element of decision is the *passion* which moves the man. And if we define a man's religion as the ultimate passion that governs his life, we come to the conclusion that religion is the one fundamental history-making force. It is the one force that governs the ultimate terms of events that take place in a man's consciousness. I don't know what Cæsar's religion was, or what he professed—and his real religion may have been different from his profession—but I do know this: that when it came to that decision on Cæsar's part, it was his grave sense of ultimate meanings, it was his religion that turned the scale. And so if we think of "Reality in History," religion is the one real history-making power to which we human beings are subject.

* * *

That brings up the question: What is the difference in religions? What difference does the specific type of religion make in the kind of decisions at which men arrive?

It would be a rather elaborate, and I think unnecessary, task to consider in this connection the great variety of human religions; but I think we can say that among the religions of our world there are certain radical differences. All of them are alike in one respect so long as they deal with the happiness of mankind. They all admonish men not to yield to their simple animal passions. They all put up sign-posts of danger at the allurement of pleasure. Buddhism, Christianity, Stoicism, Confucianism, Taoism all urge men to choose riches of the spirit, which are not the same as the riches sought by our natural desires. In other words, all religion is to a certain extent other-worldly and brings in a rebuke to the natural impulses of the human will.

Christianity, I think, is perhaps the most emphatic of religions in this respect. We sometimes contrast Christianity and Buddhism and say that Christianity is the more optimistic. But think of Christianity as saying, "Set your affections on things above," or "Take no thought for the morrow." What has Christianity said about forsaking even the family affections of this world for something greater? "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

In the early stages of Christianity the Christian "contempt of the world" was as sharp, as bitter and as extreme as has appeared in any

religion at any time. There was even a hunger for martyrdom, and Christianity distinguished itself among the powers of the ancient world for the degree with which Christians could, with apparent happiness, turn their backs on "all things which the Gentiles seek." Christianity and Stoicism were close neighbors, for Stoicism was doing the same thing. If you compare Christianity and Stoicism, you will find that both were trying to wean men away from the world because the world's goods were illusory and they wanted to escape from their snare. Christianity and Stoicism were not interested as were Hinduism and Buddhism in the escape from pain. The Stoics would say: "We want self-control; we want self-possession; we want that kind of steadiness of mind that comes from knowing those things which are worth while, and despising those things which are not worth while." And so the Stoic became a man of discipline, inflexible will, proud to say when he stood before Cæsar, "You may take my life, but you cannot command my opinion." Stoicism was alienated from the world for the sake of human dignity and self-respect. For the Christians, the ambition was slightly different: it was to be worthy of their Master, to be worthy of their ideal of Christ. It was to be free from sin; it was to become holy. That was the ambition of the Christians.

Now Stoicism has disappeared—not entirely, for I don't think it is fair to say that Stoicism has disappeared, because there is an element of Stoicism in us. Stoicism came to England, was translated by King Alfred and many distinguished successors. It became almost identified with "philosophy" in the English mind, understood as the capacity to endure hardship without complaint. But Stoicism as a system of thought and a way of life has disappeared.

Why did Stoicism die? Partly because Stoicism was an incomplete religion. There was no excuse for bringing in this world at all. It gave a person an excuse for being a man, but no excuse for being a human being. Christianity spurred him on to being a human being.

There is a curious element in Christianity, a curious unsymmetry in the way in which Christ talked about worldly goods. For example, Christ admonished his disciples to give a cup of cold water in the name of a disciple; but a cup of cold water is after all a bit of worldly goods, and for every one who gives such a benefit, there must be one to receive it and consider it good. Yes, the Christians were commanded to feed the hungry, to visit those that were in prison, to heal the sick. Christianity recommended renunciation of such goods on the part of the disciples for the sake of giving them to somebody else who must be willing to receive them. What was the good in one hand was apparently not

the good in the other hand. The explanation lies in the fact that there was something in Christianity which made the whole act better than the mere giving of a cup of water. I don't think Christianity was especially interested in giving a cup of water just to be humane, that might be left to men's natural kindness, on which "humanism" so heavily relies. The point was that in helping those in need "in the name of a disciple" a divine ministration was performed. It means that in this world the relation of man and man changed into a relation between man and God. It gave people something to do in the field of human conduct—that is, in "history,"—and made the doing of those things of the utmost importance without any lessening or any emphasizing of the normal value of earthly goods.

That is the paradox of Christianity. It was because Christianity was a religion which at once detached men from the all-importance of this life and then restored to it a divine importance that it survived when Stoicism went to the wall.

* * *

Now I should like to take this theme and pursue it through two or three aspects of Western civilization; first of all, in regard to the thing that we call "rights." Western civilization is built on the concept of rights. It is very strange how slowly this concept emerges in law. Only at a comparatively late date does the phrase "a right" work itself into English literature. I think it is safe to say that John Locke first used the phrase "a right" as a property of an individual quite normally. John Locke, born in 1632, is a contemporary of New England. Think of John Locke growing up with us. Think of him expressing this concept of individual human rights, and you will see how very recent in history was this notion of such rights.

Now Christianity was back of this idea. If you have examined Christianity at work in the Roman world and contrasted it with the work of Stoicism in the Roman world, you will see certain striking contrasts. The Stoics were opposed to infanticide, abortions, and gladiatorial combats, as were the Christians. Christianity and Stoicism were partners in good works. But the strange thing is that Stoicism never accomplished anything in the way of public reform. Yet when the Christians became a power in the Roman world, the first reform was the abolition of gladiatorial combats. W. E. H. Lecky, in his *History of European Morals,* puts this down as one of the most important reforms in the history of mankind.

Now it is important to see why that took place. The Christians had little to say about the inhumanity of the games or the sufferings of the

gladiators. The Christians' attention was directed to the spectators, to those persons, presumably high in Roman society, turning their thumbs down and saying, "Let him be killed!" The Christian judgment was that those persons were guilty of murder, and worse than murder, because they were sending into eternity the souls of the gladiators who had no chance to repent and be baptized. In other words, the interest of the Christian was devoted to the souls of men and not to their bodies. The same thing was true with reference to their opposition to infanticide and abortions. It was because infanticide means the death of the child before he has had an opportunity to be baptized, and if you kill the child in the womb, you are running the risk of sending a soul into the other world unbaptized. Thus the interest was in the soul.

Christianity was absolutely rigid on this point. It allowed no compromises. That showed the reason why Christianity and Rome could not get on until Christianity had become the religion of the empire. Judaism was equally obstinate about its worship: but Judaism was localized, whereas Christianity was spreading everywhere: it was therefore a public menace as Judaism was not.

Christianity set up a no-compromise program on everything that touched the soul of man. The moment that Christianity had power these abuses disappeared like dead leaves. And we find in like manner that this Christian interest in the soul has existed through European history.

The first great human combat with the Western world was for liberty of conscience, the right to worship as one thought right. Then came those struggles of modern times which have eventuated in the democratic revolutions. I think Hegel in deriving democracy from the spirit of the Reformation has seen more deeply into the meaning of modern democracy than any other historian. So far for the development of the notion of rights; it is evidently owing chiefly to the passions which we may call Christian.

* * *

Consider now this other interesting factor of Western civilization—science and natural law. The usual interpretation of our historians has been that there was a warfare between science and religion. This warfare was at its height, we are told, between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and centered around the great works of Copernicus, Kepler, Bruno and Galileo. These were the most amazing one hundred and fifty years in the history of mankind so far as the intellect is concerned. It marks the declaration of independence of the scientific mind from the domination of all religions.

Let us look a little more closely at this rebellion, this declaration of independence. Bruno, I think, is the turning point. He was burned at the stake in 1600. Bruno, as a small boy, lived in Nola, about twenty miles north of Naples. At the age of twelve he had the first opportunity to go to Naples. Many times he had seen Vesuvius in the distance, and often he had wondered if he might go to Naples and see it. When he got to Naples he climbed the slopes of Vesuvius and looked around to see if he could see Nola. From Nola, Vesuvius had looked like a great, gray, not particularly lovely hill. But when he climbed Vesuvius, he found that it, like Nola, was also green and lovely, and as he looked in the distance he was surprised to discover that Nola was gray and vague and not particularly lovely.

Now many a boy has made this observation before: that distance makes a difference in your perspective. But it was now Bruno's mind on which this commonplace observation fell. Note the kind of fruit it bore: "Vesuvius was on my horizon. Now that I stand at it, it isn't any longer the horizon; it is the center. There are other horizons beyond. If I could go and stand on them, then they in turn would be new centers." He wondered if that was the way the universe was constructed: every horizon is a new center. This led to the appalling consequence that the universe is infinite, that there is no end; time and space are endless. And if that is true, then we have to break through that circular realm of heaven which St. Thomas and Aristotle and others talked about; we have to break through the notion of a bounded universe, and we have to stop believing that we in this world are at the center of things: there is no periphery, and so no center.

So Bruno had come upon the truth that Copernicus had discovered, and had gone beyond Copernicus, because Copernicus also believed that there was a closed circumference of things.

Thus Bruno's mind conceived the infinite universe. But beside this, he could not accept the degradation of matter. The usual belief was that hell was the region downward and that heaven was the region upward. We human beings live between hell and heaven, on the surface of the earth, which is, so to speak, the cover of hell. Bruno said this is absolutely wrong. God is everywhere. Matter is a divine thing. As a religious boy he went to the monastery, but he wasn't a boy who was able to keep his mouth shut. After he had been there for a few years he found it prudent to run away. His life was the life of a fugitive, yet a firebrand for ardent beliefs, which to him were the religious positions. He went to the stake because of these two beliefs: that the universe is infinite and that matter is a divine thing. And when he came before the court that

sentenced him, it was he who had the consciousness of being a religious person. It was to him no warfare of science against religion, but the warfare of a better religion against a poorer religion. He said to those who sat in judgment upon him: "With more fear do you pronounce sentence upon me than I receive it."

If we look more closely into these one hundred and fifty years, we find that something like that was in men's minds. Most of them were trained in the church.

And now what has been the outcome? Empirical science. Is there anything religious about that? I wish to say that I think there is. It is a moral attitude. It is an attitude of honor in recognizing the facts. It is an attitude of reverence in recognizing the divine.

Now the scientist does not use the word *God,* but he does use the attitude of reverence. You recall Bacon's advice: "If you are going to master nature, you must first of all obey her." Obedience on the part of man is the clue to mastery. Does Bacon's aphorism sound anything like this: "If you are to save your life, you must lose it"? It is the same thing. The empirical attitude is the lineal descendant of the paradox of the Cross. Just as this maxim is the soul of Christian ethics, the same unselfishness is the soul of empirical science.

Now we are prepared to answer the question why empirical science blossomed in Europe and has not blossomed in Asia. It is not because of climate or race or resources or any of these things. It is not because of economic disturbance, and the new worlds opened by exploration. It is because Europe for seven centuries was under the spell of a religion of unselfishness, and natural science was born as the legitimate child of that spirit.

* * *

Now one further thing: science has in it a promise of power. It is the most powerful thing that we have. I want to point out to you that it is beginning to be a Nemesis of power. It is undermining itself today.

For science, in opening up this region of infinitude, is opening up the humiliation of the human spirit. In the infinitude of space and time humanity loses not only its importance, but all direction of value as well. There cannot be a goal to an infinite process. There is a loss of meaning. Man does not mean anything if he is simply part of the astronomical scheme, or if he is purely a biological product as a piece of nature. Under the spell of scientific revelation we lose our own importance; and losing our sense of importance, we lose our capacity to love one another, because

that is based on the belief that man is worth loving. Civilization begins to undermine those things which have held it up.

We have always needed an *antidote for infinitude.* That attitude is deeper than science—something which looks very deeply and quietly and is quite unseen by the historian. Christianity has brought the center of the importance of things into the Now. Christianity has created a sort of feeling of the domesticity of the world, has made it seem like home, in which each person is as important as every other one.

And I suppose this is the essential meaning of the incarnation: that God is in the midst of things. It isn't "a far off divine event toward which the whole creation moves": but the divine event is *now.* What is divine about Jesus? His separate personality as pictured with a halo around it? That was not the figure seen by those of his time. The divinity of Christ was not in himself, but in the way he treated men. He brought out from them their divine capacity. His own divinity was exhibited in the divinity which he brought to the surface. He was divine in the way he treated men, as though they were potentially divine. This kind of thing has encouraged us to take the attitude of God. Where God is, there is no worry about time or space. God may be present in every direct act. That is the incarnation.

* * *

Christianity has made history in a silent way, easily missed by the historian. It has encouraged men while humbling and chastening them. It has given men rights without supposing that those rights are costless. It has put divine power and joy within their reach, but only at the price of divine love and the readiness to suffer. It has put science at their command, but with the admonition that a misread science will destroy the whole sense of the life from which it comes.

And thus Christianity continues as it has been through a score of centuries, sustaining in men that passion for living greatly, from which all history draws whatever it has of guidance, or power, or inner worth, that is to say, of reality.

ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING CLASS OF CROZER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

JAMES H. FRANKLIN, President

We have just listened to an address by an eminent philosopher and historian, Dr. William Ernest Hocking, of Harvard University, on the theme "Reality in Christian History." You are to be congratulated that just as you are entering upon active work in life you have been permitted to listen to such a profound address on such a subject by one who is known for his passion for truth and who is honored in so many directions for his extraordinary ability to recognize reality and to give the world the benefit of his discernment of eternal values in both history and philosophy. We who are responsible for the conduct of this school are grateful that from such a teacher as Professor Hocking we receive at least a measure of commendation of the traditions of Crozer Theological Seminary and of our aspirations for the future.

What we have heard this morning enriches our minds and hearts, and it is all the more appreciated because it strengthens our determination to go on and on in the search for truth—for facts, for reality—being more and more persuaded that

> He is free whom the truth makes free,
> And all are slaves beside.

Every real student knows that much has been taught in the name of religion and even in the name of Christianity which lacks reality, and discerning men today are convinced that even the Christian forces of the world must fearlessly face facts and abandon whatever is unreal or unrelated to the needs of mankind if they are not to be weighed and found wanting. Again the axe lieth at the root of ecclesiastical trees, and those that put not forth good fruit will be hewn down and cast into the fire. Again the eternal Harvester walks the earth with his fan in his hand. He will thoroughly cleanse his threshing floors. He will gather into his garner the wheat on which the souls of men may feed, but the chaff of meaningless formalism and worn out traditions he will burn up with unquenchable fire. He that hath ears to hear let him hear.

I charge you, members of the graduating class, that you ever seek to discover truth. Buy it for yourselves, however great the price, and part not with it, however great may be the temptation to conform to popular clamor in support of error. You have been awarded degrees, diplomas or certificates from a school which stands for reality in religion

and fears no fact that may be discovered. I charge you to go out into life determined to stand against all sham, mummery, and second-hand traditions.

Intelligence and intellectual integrity are absolutely essential in the realm of religion as well as elsewhere. There is no hope of permanent progress for humanity except as religion is intelligently and honestly interpreted and applied to life. Let this be said with no ambiguity. At the same time let it be as strongly said that reality is not confined to the realm of pure reason alone. Man must love God with his heart as truly as with his mind, and with his heart first of all. There may be as much reality in the experience of the heart as in the convictions of the mind. Many of us know heroic characters whose intellectual interpretations of religion are most crude and childish, but who in their hearts have found Christ such a transforming power that in the highest sense they know reality in religion. They know him whom they have believed, and they are fully persuaded that he is able to preserve for them all that they have entrusted to him.

Again, the reality of your religion must be demonstrated in your lives. "By their fruits ye shall know them." You have been taught here to look for God in life rather than, as someone has said, in the waste-baskets of monasteries, however valuable may be the fragments of ancient manuscripts. Never forget that God is as truly in the world today as ever he was and that he is making himself known in the hearts and lives of men as truly now as at any time in history. Doctor Hocking has told us: "God is in the midst of things. . . The divine event is now." Doctor Hocking has added: "God may be present in every direct act. That is the incarnation."

You are beginning your active work at a moment when all religion is being challenged. If we are to prove the reality of the Christian religion, we must have a demonstration of its power in helping men to meet their most distressing needs, spiritual and temporal. But there are voices which blatantly affirm that all religion is an opiate, inducing inaction on the part of humanity. Even Christianity, they affirm, has no basis of reality and is of no value in helping to solve the world's greatest problems. Yet we dare affirm that the way of life as taught by Jesus, which finds its highest exemplification on Calvary, is based on reality and furnishes the spiritual stimulus needed by men to induce them to pour out their lives in service for their fellows. Our distinguished speaker of the morning, in a very remarkable address on Evangelism a year or so ago, said: "If we consider history, we find that Christianity is the one religion under which men have fought for the rights of others, as

well as for their own rights. It is the one religion under which the law of civil right has grown strong. It has a structural force which is not in any other religion of the world." Indeed the gospel is a stimulant to men to fight for the rights of others. Religion has found in Christ the opposite of an opiate.

Would you come to a satisfactory sense of reality in religion? Then surrender your lives fully to the Christ of Calvary. Stand at the foot of his cross until you lose yourself under the spell of his self-giving and go out in sacrificial service for others. That is a path which leads to a fresh sense of the reality of God and the reality of his presence with us. That is the path in which we find such a satisfying sense of reality for ourselves that we shall desire men everywhere to walk therein. Let it always be your highest desire to help others into the path in which they may discover for themselves the reality of God and the life eternal.

THE REALITY OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

HALFORD E. LUCCOCK
Professor of Homiletics, Yale Divinity School

I WOULD like at the very beginning to use as a grace, the lines of Henry Van Dyke's hymn, "The sea is great, our boats are small." Particularly this little rowboat that is now setting out.

May I bring into sight two affirmations, neither of them to be sketched in, but to be a part of the back-drop of our thinking. They are complementary and in conflict, and the tension between them adds to the complexity of our time.

First, *this is not a time when it is easy to believe in God.* It is not easy for this generation to find such signs of his presence in the world as would make an obvious basis for religious experience. You may ask, "When was such a time?" I suppose the true answer is, "Never." Yet certainly our time has peculiar obstacles, intensified in unique ways. There is no need to recall them in detail. We say it over often like a painful rosary. The international collapse, the economic disaster, the questioning of moral standards, the wide feeling of the impotence of the church, all make for many the still small voice seem very still indeed. It is too grim a mood to be dissipated by any performance of neat little arguments, no matter how agile they may be.

Second, *the conviction of God's reality, of the genuineness of contact with God, is measurelessly important for human life.* That is an axiom for Christian thinking, but a forgotten one over large areas of life. We have been told endlessly that religion is an illusion necessary to the adolescence of the race but now that we have grown up we should put away childish things. A close look at our world makes it evident that that is like saying, "Now that we have become men we must put away childish things, like water and food." Dostoievsky's word, "The man who bows down to nothing cannot bear the burden of himself," interprets a great deal of experience in our present world. Some of the tragedies of our industrial life are those of people having to work in an atmosphere, in mines and tunnels, to which man's nature is not adapted, in devitalized air from which oxygen has been withdrawn. Multitudes are demonstrating today that when that same thing is done spiritually, life shrinks and collapses.

With those two things then, the difficulty and necessity of religious experience, as part of the scenery, let us consider some remembrances

with which to start. There is a profound word on this whole matter from Coleridge, " Make any truth too definite and you make it too small." Coming at the time that it did, when men were felt to be living in a tight, cosy, closed system of a physical world, that statement was an intuitive recognition of the dynamic quality of the universe. It was akin to Bergson's protest a century later against " frozen conceptualism," that is taking living, flowing, dynamic, many-sided experience and crowding it into rigid rationalistic pigeonholes and freezing it there. The history of physics for a generation furnishes a striking comment on Coleridge's " making truth too definite." Matter has dissolved into equations. The old universe had a greater fall than Humpty Dumpty. The too definite proved too small also in economics. Under the hurricane of the war and the world-wide depression, the eternal word once delivered to the classical economist is gone with the wind. And the too definite in religion, as laid down both by those outside and inside, is too small for a living flow of experience. John Buchan writes of Archbishop Laud, " He brought the mind of a college pedant to the broad and spacious life of England." Too often we have allowed ourselves to be browbeaten by those who brought the mind of a pedant, with its ludicrously definite measures of scientific knowedge, to the breadth and spaciousness of the response of the whole personality to the whole of life, which is included in what we call religious experience.

Let us say just a brief preliminary word about *the instruments* of religious experience. They are more like the antennæ of a radio, or the sensitivity of a magnetic needle, than they are like a grocer's scales for weighing sugar, or a chemist's tube, or a logician's syllogisms. The reality of religious experience does not depend on a geometrical proof of God. When we speak, as a theologian does, of the " stinging coerciveness " of Jesus, it is not logical compulsion of proof which is meant. There is none. There may be an A, B, C in religion. There is no Q. E. D. The surrender of faith to God is not at all like the acceptance of the conclusion of an argument. It is rather the beginning of an adventure. We cannot even define that to which faith is committed in adventure. For as the French saying goes, " God defined is God finished." God analyzed is God dead. There is real insight in the reply of a school child asked to write on the subject, " The funniest thing I ever saw." He wrote, " The funniest thing I ever saw was too funny for words." Right! So the mind says, " The greatest thing I ever saw is too great for words." It breaks through language and escapes. Religious experience is a venture of personality in response to an eliciting environment. There lies the

zest of life and the very essence of religion. There is a very true word of Christopher Morley in a little poem called "No Coaching":

I went to the theatre
With the author of the successful play.
He insisted on explaining everything;
Told me what to watch;
The details of direction,
The errors of the property man,
The foibles of the star.
He anticipated all my surprises
And ruined the evening.
Never again! And mark you,
The greatest author of all
Made no such mistake.

The highest expressions of religion have been recognitions that "God made no such mistake." Religion is choice, risk, test. "I do not ask to see the distant scene." "Though he slay me, yet will I trust him." "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for."

The instruments of religious experience and of Christian experience are all the endowments of the mind and spirit. The person who insists that religious experience is an illusion unless it can be proved with the scientific instruments of knowledge, is not only inadequate but impertinent. He is exactly like a man trying to get the Flower Show over the radio. Color and perfume are a bit beyond the range of a loud speaker, no matter how many tubes the set may have. But they are none the less real on that account. The color and perfume of experience are beyond capture by quantitative measurement. This is true in all walks of life. Often, however, we allow ourselves to be overborne in religion and sink into the depths of an inferiority complex when some one comes along, like a bully swinging a club, and tells us that religious experience cannot be proved by astronomy, chemistry or psychology. We forget that the scientific bully could not prove half of what he knows, and the best half, that which he stakes his life on, with those same instruments. He may come out of his laboratory and heaven pity him if he tries to know his friends by the same infallible proofs of scientific dissection! He knows them in more accurate and adequate ways—through intuition—through faith, and sympathy. Professor Eddington has drawn a conclusive picture of this. He says, "The materialist who is convinced that all phenomena arise from electrons, and quanta and the like, controlled by mathematical formulæ must presumably hold the belief that his wife is a rather elaborate differential equation; but he is probably tactful enough not to obtrude

this opinion in domestic life." He brings to that realm more fitting ways of knowing. To come to that great undertaking, " to know God, whom to know aright is life eternal," with any hope of achievement we must use the means adequate, observation of life and information, and testimony, of course, but also, experiment and discovery, insight and inference.

Let us briefly examine four lines of march for our thinking.

I

First, the reality of Christian experience is found in the way in which Jesus meets our nature. Christian experience is one form of religious experience and some of the weight of evidence for its reality comes from the testimony of religious experience in general. The testimony, in brief, is an amplification of Augustine's, " Thou hast formed us for thyself." The testimony of the eternal outreach of man tends toward the affirmation that the capacity for God is as much a part of man's nature as his adaptation to anything in his environment, the sight to objects, the hearing to sound, the lungs to air. Up and down through all the nooks and corners of the calendar and out through all the spread of the earth, we meet it, in varying forms of one unending search. Religion persists in spite of all the solemn and conclusive burial services held over it, because it meets this ineradicable need, with which man started on his human journey and of which he becomes more conscious the farther he goes.

It is not any more imported into man by imagination or manipulation than is sex or hunger. It is there. It is there, even when one gives up formal religious belief. Witness the testimony of Katherine Mansfield, in a casual letter, " God is now gone for all of us. Yet we must believe. And not only that, we must carry our weakness and our sin and our devilishness to somebody." Notice the musts, " we must believe; we must carry our weakness." Through these words it is the human race speaking. It is both a belief in a spiritual power outside the seen universe with which fellowship is possible and a belief in the outward validity of the compulsions on conduct which are inwardly felt. Now, of course, one can call that aspect of man's nature " the great illusion." But one does not speak the last word in that easy phrase. For when anyone says it he subscribes to the strangest violation of the procedure of nature that could be imagined, a nature where organisms adapt themselves to reality in their environment. Georgia Harkness has written, " a deep-seated, long-persisting human quest is more likely to be organically related to reality than that which is inconsequential and temporary." Religion is, of course, personal, but not on that account necessarily subjective. The weight of the history of religion points to religion as a response to some-

thing dependable and eternal. Boutroux has called it, "the response to the Beyond which is within," or as Dean W. R. Matthews has amended that to "the Beyond which is akin." This latter phrase finds an echo in the classic passage from William James in which he declares that his reading the lives of religious people had so strengthened his faith in God's living presence that he was unable to "pooh-pooh" it away and found in himself a "germ of something similar which makes response." "The Beyond which is akin"; a germ of something similar which makes response!

That experience of men in general can be paralleled by the individual who cares to test it in his own life. Let one begin with something he is sure of, some way of life that is seen as everlastingly right. Let him live up to that and follow it, faithfully and persistently. He will come to feel that the voice calling him along that path is not simply his own voice, and that purity, honesty and love which call are neither mere whims nor habits but have their source in reality.

Jesus meets our nature in a manner unique and permanently compelling. At the place where he does meet human needs there is the seat of authority in religion. May I try the aid of a homely, visual illustration? In the old-fashioned electric arc light there was a carbon coming down from above and one coming up from beneath. When the current was turned on, a flame leaped across the gulf between them. That may be not too inaccurate a picture of the instinctive human response to Jesus. There is the message and person of Jesus coming down, as it were, from the world of eternal reality and man's need reaching up and a flame leaps across. Jesus lays an imperative on human life whenever he gets a chance to confront it. In moments of high visibility, when we get real glimpses, both of what we ought to be and what we might be, Jesus puts a compulsion on us.

The finest words for that compulsion, I think, are to be found in King Lear. In one scene the banished Duke of Kent, returns in disguise to take service with King Lear and this dialogue takes place:

> LEAR: What wouldst thou?
> KENT: Service.
> LEAR: Whom wouldst thou serve?
> KENT: You.
> LEAR: Dost know me, fellow?
> KENT: No, but thou hast in thy countenance that which I would fain call master.

Those last words may well stand for the response made to Jesus by uncounted millions.

I have been greatly interested many times to see that same pull of

authority, not only when one exposes himself to the figure of Jesus but whenever people catch a glimpse of the spirit of Jesus as they have seen it in human life. It comes from the most unexpected places. One of the most striking of those places recently is that which I have found in one of the roughest, toughest books that I have ever read in my life, *The Way of a Transgressor.* It records about twenty years of the roving journeys of a cynical newspaper reporter over post-war Europe, where he met the leading figures of Europe and had very little real confidence in any one of them. In a wholly unintended manner he takes off his hat in reverence before just two people, Lord Irwin, the Governor-General of India, and George Lansbury, the leader of the Labor Party at that time in England. It occurred to me that they were the only two desperate Christians he ever met in his life. When, from his background and his experience he came up close to some life through which there could stream out the radiance of Jesus, he too said, " There is that in thy countenance which I would fain call master."

Jesus meets our nature at central points. He meets it in that dim borderland where our reach exceeds our grasp. Our inability to find fulfilment in material things as other creatures of earth do, fits in, is morticed in, as it were, to Jesus' revelation of the great Other, the God in whom our fragments are complete. Our dissatisfaction with ourselves, our inescapable sense of missing the mark, fits in with Jesus' own demonstration, not merely of the life we are meant for, but of the possibility of forgiveness and a life made over. Our experience of the strange self-defeating quality of selfishness fits into Jesus' call to fulfilment in service.

In that fit there is the quality of an undebatable compulsion. We can trace in the Christian experience of the first century how that compulsion grew to take in wider meaning and how it grows today. The disciples began with a very simple fact. Here was a person, a fact in their daily experience. They responded to that. He said " Follow me," and they followed him. But they could not keep their eyes on that person; he had a way of turning them back on themselves. They were faced, not merely with an attractive person, but by an uncomfortable moral challenge. " He that is not with me is against me." Later this moral fact and challenge could be explained only as a spiritual fact. Jesus came to represent the reality of God.

Something like that still goes on. Jesus as a person, a fact of history, cannot be shoved out of the way by the crowding of nineteen centuries. He is a moral challenge, deeply disturbing because deeply compelling, so compelling that it carries the overtones of a cosmic voice, a source in the ultimate reality in the universe.

Does this sound more like personal confession than argument? The only effective persuasion in the realm of experience has been confession. Paul, when given a chance to defend the faith, always slides into autobiography. Christianity is invitation rather than debate. To those who try it, Jesus' way of life becomes its own evidence. That movement of the disciple's experience may be ours. If we are honest with life, that is, if we face life honestly and sincerely, and are willing to learn what it has to teach, we do become aware of one who speaks to us through duty and love—not something but Someone.

It is very evident that the chief instrument for such experience is not hard thinking, it is living. It is not those who think hardest and longest, but those who live fullest and deepest who travel the path to assurance of reality. If we want to verify religion, we must first choose it. Commitment of self to an experiment with a way of living leads to experience.

II

Second, consider one particular aspect of the reality of Christian experience, the experience of things so worthful that they cannot be accounted for by any naturalistic explanation. An irreducible part of religious experience is the experience of values. Here is something with more than an instrumental usefulness, with an inherent worth in itself, such as truth, beauty, goodness. We did not make them. They wield command over us. What do they say to us?

One of the best stories connected with the Grand Canyon is that of the man who on first seeing it, paid it the tribute of reverent silence, and then exclaimed, "My, something must have happened here." Quite probably! It was a bit obvious that an Indian did not drive a rude plow along the ground and thus create that vast chasm. A cause sufficient to produce the result is necessary. The thing is too big, too awe-inspiring for any trivial explanation. Those very words may well describe the feeling men have had times without number when looking at another sort of awe-inspiring wonder, the presence in human lives of the morally big, awe-inspiring manifestation of fidelity, honor, courage, magnanimity or sacrifice. "Something must have happened here!" Something great enough to produce the effect. "O we're sunk enough here, God knows." There is evil as well as good, pigmy smallness as well as moral stature. Yet along the common highways there is greatness passing by. We have seen it and admitted its right to command. The fruits of the spirit, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control, these are not hothouse products, rare as an orchid. They grow in the open in all seasons, in the plainest back yards. To meet them, to

manifest them, to feel their coerciveness, is to have a religious experience, for they carry overtones of an unseen spiritual environment in which they have their source.

This recognition of values is not to be confused with a romantic sense of the goodness of human nature which makes for self-sufficiency and is an arch enemy of religious experience. In a very deep sense we can find God only when we have lost trust in ourselves. Such experience of values is not the confident humanism which was so disastrous a mark of the pre-war mentality of the world. It is the recognition of the qualities of acts which need a cause great enough to account for them, and to account for their undebatable command over us. On this point it is historically true that the recognition of moral values always moves toward religion, or, as one philosopher says, "morality trembles on the brink of religion." That moral consciousness finds its support in an affirmation that its judgments of value issue from a reality outside of itself.

One illustration of this, concerns the highest values the race has ever experienced. I made a sentimental pilgrimage last summer to South Kensington Museum in London to look up some of my ancestors. They were your ancestors, too, so you have no cause to feel superior. I went to see the skulls of some of the First Families, the Neanderthal man and the Java man. I was looking for one in particular, the Galilee man whose skull was dug up in Galilee. I was interested in him through the remark about him in Doctor Fosdick's *Pilgrimage to Palestine,* contrasting the Galilee man with the man of Galilee. I did not find the skull. It is too precious to expose to public view. Also, all the bones are not present. But I did find a plaster cast. As one looks at that low slanting forehead (he was the original low-brow), the question comes, How did humanity ever get up the long climb from the Galilee man to the man of Galilee? Is it not as reasonable, to use the language of understatement, to ascribe the supreme manifestation of spirit to a spirit akin to it in the universe, as to ascribe it to the accidental stirrings of some vast mud pie?

That is only a dramatic form of the compulsion laid upon us to seek the vindication of our highest moral values, which life needs both for its zest and significance, in their origin in a creator and preserver of values. As R. H. Strachan puts it in one sentence, "In every compelling vision of truth, beauty or goodness, we hear a voice saying 'Have I been so long among you and you have not known me?'" Duty, truth and love compel men, because they are rooted in the structure of the universe. Deep calls to deep. When we yield to them we are not merely following an idea of our own, not merely entertaining an idea of any kind but are

surrendering ourselves to an absolute demand, reaching out for a soul akin to us at the heart of the universe. The good which stirs men must be a part of a larger good, as real as granite or a star. That pull on man is not fiction but every-day reality. Recently at a college in a discussion group a student said to me with a fine, courteous air, "I hope you won't mind if I say that religion is all moonshine." I said, "No, I wouldn't mind it at all." After a bit I added, "But I'd like to thank you for that word, moonshine." I felt like the character in the trial scene in the Merchant of Venice who keeps dancing around the room exclaiming, "Oh wise young man, I thank thee for that word." I asked the student, "Have you ever been in Panama?" He said, "No, but what has Panama got to do with religion?" I said, "There's a lot of moonshine in Panama." I asked if he had ever seen a twenty-two-foot tide come in, such as there is in Panama. If one has never seen a twenty-two-foot tide come in he has missed something worth watching. There is an unbelievable lift of billions of tons of water, and what is doing it? Moonshine! The pull of another world, unseen but resistless force. Religion is unseen and real like moonshine in its measureless lift to life.

III

There is another aspect of religious experience which I am confident will be more and more convincing in the years to come. It is the social validation of Christianity. The passing parade of life and history make clear that Jesus was everlastingly right in his reading of life. Some of the most effective arguments for Christianity are not being spun out of the brains of theologians but are being shaped by events, by events of contemporary history. This demonstration brings daily testimony to the truth that other foundation can no man lay for lasting security, economic welfare and peace than that which is laid in Christ Jesus. We are members one of another. And when that essential unity is denied the society which desires it starts on the road to disaster.

We have been given for generations the conventional picture of Jesus as a gentle, mildly idiotic sentimentalist, a figure for poetry and art, unfitted for any contact with the rough realities of the world. That picture is steadily changing for anyone not deaf, dumb and blind. Jesus is emerging as the sternest realist who ever injected hard truth into a world ruled by illusion. The sentimentalist at the Versailles Peace Conference was not Jesus. The sentimentalists were the romantic fools who imagined it possible to build security and peace on a basis of hate and revenge.

Gilbert Stuart, who painted so many portraits of George Washing-

ton, that one wonders how either of them ever had time for anything else, once looked at Talleyrand the French statesman, when he was in America, and made the remark, "If that man is not a scoundrel God does not write a legible hand." God writes a legible hand. Sometimes he writes on a human face. Sometimes, as in our own United States at the present time, he writes very legibly on the face of the land. The succession of dust storms and floods, drought and erosion of the soil is legible writing to the effect that whatever a man or a nation sows that shall it also reap. When for generations men have abused and exploited the land, slaughtering the forests and skinning the top soil, we pay for it in disaster. Such calamities are not, as our blasphemous phrase goes, "acts of God." They are acts of man, of man's greed.

God writes a legible hand in the economic and international world. Jesus does not come into our world like a Rip Van Winkle, antiquated, and alien in speech and garb. He comes with the only way of life which will stand in our interdependent world, a way based on mutuality and common welfare. In religious terms, which are true in every realm, it is a way of love and brotherhood. Jesus stands in our world as the stone which is the head of the corner, "and whoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken."

IV

The effective apologetics of the future will not be argument so much as demonstration. It will be the creation of a world, a way of common living together, in which it will be possible and natural for men to believe in God.

We cannot separate social effort for a Christlike world from the subject of the reality of religious experience. Religion can never be genuinely experienced in a social vacuum. We cannot say, "Go to now, I will have a religious experience." The experience of doing God's will, in the concrete setting of today's life and need, is an inseparable part of the consciousness of God. If God is love, the only adequate means of fellowship with such a God is by the practice of love.

The Book of Acts gives an eternally valid picture of this. When the early Christian group actually practiced love, within the terms of their situation, when they "had all things in common," there resulted a glow of abounding life.

As it was in the beginning, it is now, and ever shall be.

THE REALITY OF GOD AS DISCOVERED IN SERVICE TO MAN

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HERE is another title weighty with great words. The ideas encompassed by Reality, God, Discovery, Service, Man—is there, in very truth, anything that escapes the net these words weave? I fancy that even the four little syllables—of, as, in, to—that space these verbal giants stiffen with surprising arrogance at finding themselves in such important company. If a flower in a crannied wall could contain for the great Victorian poet the secret of what God and man is, what an arcanum is hid within these syllables—hid indeed beyond the hope that this occasion will reveal it. One is tempted to pick these words up one by one, and to look at them as one would examine jewels of great worth. Reality, God, Discovery, Service, Man—any one alone could occupy us far beyond the limits of this hour. And yet we cannot thus employ them. For they are strung into an ornament which must not be taken apart, even though the proposal to understand its assembled beauty fairly daunts our efforts to do so.

Taken together—as the theme for our study—they rest upon an assumption that seems at first glance to fall outside the limits of precise proof, namely, that it is possible to discover one thing as real, by doing something for something else. This certainly cannot be wholly true. I could not hope to prove that God is real by servicing my motor. But I am assuming it is possible to prove God real by serving my mechanic. This has not been the accepted method of philosophy hitherto; and even if, as we are now told, " reality moves creatively from concretion to concretion, while thought moves ever from abstraction to the yet more abstract," we may find it difficult to be at home with a process that derives the validity of the concept of God from an act of service to man.

For, let us be reminded, this is service to man, not service to God. There is a distinction, though service to God, if it does not soon take the form of service to man, may become mystical practice or pretense. We might find the effort to serve God directly a nebulous and even unreal thing, driving us indeed to infer that God Himself is nebulous or unreal. Nor is it just service to man, which may easily assume the character of mere humanism, or the perfunctory humanitarianism that is a poor argument for the reality of God. The emphasis presented us is that service

to man, which may be tentatively defined as "voluntary action for the highest advantage of another"—this we are being told, is a device for discovering that God is real.

There is, to be sure, some ground for such assumption in our Christian tradition. Jesus' oft quoted words "he that willeth to do . . . shall know" may be stretched without strain either to context or meaning to say that when one is minded to do something real for his earthly brother he will discover something real about his heavenly Father. And this has proven itself to be an ethical insight generally supported by experience. But even though it rests upon the fairly solid ground of experience, does it evoke the support of philosophy?

Is it valid to postulate a relation between God and man which makes it possible to know God by knowing man, as one could not know a mechanic by knowing a motor? And is our knowledge of man best achieved by serving him? To be sure a motor does tell us important things about a mechanic, but does serving a motor tell us much? To study a motor is to find out about the mechanic. To study about man is to find out about God. And while service to man is not unrelated to study about him, is it, by itself an avenue of apprehension to the reality of God?

There are three things that an inquiry about God must measurably reveal before we can be sure of him: his action, his content, his form. His form would include all possible relations sustained within the universe; his content would include his awareness of all the qualities and relations in the universe; and his action would be observed in his use of those qualities and relations in the universe that serve and direct his cosmic processes. Does man offer clues to such assurance? Will not such clues betray us into anthropomorphism which we have been told so often we must avoid like the plague? The ocean is water, so is the spring. Can one know anything about the ocean by studying the spring? Yes. Nor will we be deterred from such pursuits by a warning against deriving hydromorphic notions of the sea by such a study. Action, content, form—all are set within the narrow compass of the spring just as truly as within "the sea's vast and cooling distances." To understand man's action, content, and form does more than suggest God's action, content and form. It invites us to minister to man's action, content and form, which is perhaps the most direct approach to an understanding of man's true nature. And so, serving man may perchance invite us into the wide perspectives of the knowledge of God, as Reality.

This then is our assumption, but we must attempt to satisfy by another question before we proceed to what will be thought to be more practical matters. The problem of God is metaphysical—which means

that it relates to the whole of being. This is not to say that it is not a problem also of those components of the whole—physical, psychological, historical, sociological, and so on. God is seen physically, so to speak, "in every burning bush and flaming tree," psychologically in states of mind and the urgency of desire, historically in the movements within time, and sociologically in the group-patterns of sentient creatures. Chesterton said years ago that the quickest explanation of the Trinity was that it was not any better for God to be alone than for man, though why man's company was monogamous and God's was dichotomous, he neglected to say.

But these component relations do not render the problem less metaphysical. For a metaphysical problem must include within its scope all these and more. It must deal with them in relation to the whole, and evaluate the parts in reference to the whole, even as it evaluates the whole. God is to us in some way dominant in the universe as a whole. What is known to be true about him, cannot be derived solely from fragments, nor can this total concept about him contradict the parts. Perhaps the most significant gift to religious thought that a modern understanding of the Bible brings is that those incidents and ideas in Scripture which to an earlier day offered irreconcilable contradictions in the idea of God were due to human fallibility and folly, and were not the fault of an infallible narrator.

God, this is to say, symbolizes a unity or harmony or consistency between existence and value, between the structure and function of person as well as the structure and function of thing, and provides us with an end for, and a meaning of both human and cosmic endeavor.

Is it possible then, to bring empirical verification, such as service to man must be classified, to a metaphysical problem? This is a philosophical statement of the difficulty with which we began: Can we know one thing as real by doing something to something else?

There are, of course, all sorts of verifications. The mathematician, within his field and limited by the nature of the proposition for which verification is sought, calls upon everything from integer to divergent infinite series; so also the chemist, and the historian, each within his field. The drug the chemist uses will not do duty for the date the historian brandishes, nor will the binomial theorem impress the psychiatrist in pursuit of a psychosis. Each seeks verification in his own way with his own tools.

But will metaphysical verification differ from this observed fact in restricted fields? It differs certainly in important respects. It is quite impossible to perform crucial experiments with concepts dealing with the

whole, as it is possible and demanded in dealing with parts. And yet it is quite as impossible to avoid thinking in terms of the whole, in such a way as brings relevancy to all the parts. Is verification of the whole impossible then?

We can be helped to an answer to this if we remember that there are three facts about the empirical verifications of science that are equally true about the metaphysical verifications of philosophy. First: All proof is the experience of a prover. It makes no difference whether one is busy with a syllogism or a secretion. Logical reasoning is possible only to someone who has the powers of memory, direction, and inference. And the meaning of a scientific datum is what is actually present in the scientist's experience.

Second: All proof is part of a system. A lonely, unaccompanied fact has no meaning in itself and can verify nothing by itself. It is available in the process of verification only when it is observed within a system of interrelationships. What would a woman's hat prove if its relation to the human head were unsuspected? We cannot stop here to say what it does prove, now that the relation is established!

Third: In the final analysis, all proof is provisional, tentative. This is no less true of scientific than of metaphysical verification. No concept about the real world can be definitive until all experience, past, present and future, has been encompassed in survey and experiment. That there is such a thing as an experience or a thing rests finally on hypotheses which cannot be exhaustively verified, but which can be made to have systematic adequacy in organizing data. Back of all our pretensions to accuracy and scientific infallibility lies the final unproved metaphysical postulate. At that point, whether consciously or otherwise, the empiricist and the metaphysician meet. The scientist and the philosopher both verify by a personal experience as carefully analyzed, tested and understood as possible, set in relation to a verified and consistent system. Whether the phenomenon be diatom or deity, the method is fundamentally the same. We do not range reason on one side and experiment on the other; solipsism at one pole and empiricism at the other. All verification, so far as it is possible within the necessarily vague and inexact limits established by the nature of the mind itself, is a union of reason and experience.

What we have been trying to say is that empirical data, such as service to man, is relevant to the statement of the theistic hypothesis —such as the reality of God. And if we have here bridged the gap which some have set between man and God—the Barthian who makes God Wholly Other and the materialist who makes him holy ether—we are somewhat better prepared to undertake an understanding of the nature of

man which evokes service, and the service, which in turn evokes the sense of the reality of God.

We need to tarry but a brief interval with the proposition that man is a creature of more than time-space relations. Any effort to fix man within the strict categories of naturalism fails by the intrusion of our non-spatial and non-temporal experiences. In such cases man is truly "in the world but not of it"—within nature but not of it. We transcend the time-space continuum every time a fugitive experience is brought back by memory; or an adventurous hope moves out and down the years and fixes itself in some anticipated achievement; or when we are lost in wonder, or love, or caught in the frenzy of some great endeavor—at such times there is no time; in such places there is no place. Also in sleep or the unconsciousness of illness, time and space lose all meaning to the man whose bed to others is the place of suffering and whose pain to those who watch is a drag on the passing hours.

Not only do we recognize non-spatial and non-temporal experiences, we are also conscious of relationships that not only transcend or fall below space-time—they have no meaning at all in such categories. What of values, ideals, obligations? We cannot clock our ideals to note their speed; we do not really pack our obligations away in moth balls—though the metaphor is not infrequently borrowed to describe our delinquencies. Goodness, beauty, truth, duty—these imponderables by which we live—are not merely here now, they are everywhere, always.

Furthermore, as we look at ourselves we observe that in a unique way we respond to the telic processes in nature. Assume without debate that there are such processes. How account otherwise for the strange faculty for foresight we exhibit? It is not obscure in our infra-human co-geners, the ants to which the human sluggard was sent for instruction, the rodents that look forward instinctively to the barren winter months and provide against want. All the more so in ourselves, in the vision without which the people perish; and in the planning without which individual and social life would be wildly chaotic.

And what of desires—those normative evaluations of life itself? Is there a source and support of desire in nature? Why the wish to be good, or to be thought good? Here—if we are to remain naturalists—is a problem as thorny as the problem of evil. And what of mysticism? Not in its bizarre and theatrical manifestations, but in that ecstasy that bears with it an impulse to creativity—so lofty that it may well be the reflection of a cosmic purpose. Such has been the experience of Paul and St. Francis, Joan of Arc and Catherine of Sienna, George Fox and Henry Thoreau, C. F. Andrews and Gandhi.

Here then is man living in time but not in thrall to it, living in space but not its minion. And if this accurately describes him, then he is empirically described. And if non-temporal and non-spatial experience can be empirically verified, we have suggested an empirical approach to the hypothesis of God. If a time-space world is the only world, the empirical case for Theism is hopeless. If additional data is suggested by experience, the case may at least be remanded to a higher and perhaps wiser court of appeal. It was ancient wisdom that spoke of God as "dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto," as one "in whom there is no darkness at all." Does this not suggest a light beyond time, uninterrupted by our regular nocturnal interval?

We assert then that a definite effort to minister to the qualities of the human spirit that can transcend time and space—which indeed is our reasonable service—leads us into an area of an understanding of God, who by all hypotheses must transcend such relations and give meaning to them if he be God. This is not to segregate one type of service and make it minister to one special need. Service to man cannot be so divided. To call one type of ministry spiritual and another secular or physical is to fall into the commonest of errors. For what is the aim of all service, whether to the mind confused by doubt or distraught with fear, or to the body wracked by pain or hunger? Is it not to bring to bear on both mind and body influences, whether they be in the form of aliment or assurance, that will lift the needy one out of the pressures of time and space—to leave them, in the familiar words "in the world but not of it"?

This is what we mean then by the phrase, service to man. It is the effort to enhance those qualities which make us uniquely what we are —that "voluntary action for the highest advantage of another" as we defined it earlier. It remains to say somewhat about the implications of this idea of service, and finally to suggest how it can make God real for us.

The relation of service to religion is not novel. It is observed in all of the great religions. An illustration from Buddhism must suffice for the type commonly designated "heathen." Edwin Arnold, in *The Light of Asia,* describes how the young Prince Siddartha, emerging for the first time from his sheltered life, discovers the world.

> But looking deep, he saw
> The thorns which grow upon the rose of life. . .
> The Prince Siddartha sighed—"Is this," he said,
> "That happy earth they brought me forth to see?
> How salt with sweat the peasant's bread! how hard

> The oxen's service! In the brake how fierce
> The war of weak and strong! i' th' air what plots!
> No refuge e'en in water. Go aside
> A space, and let me muse on what ye show."
> So saying, the good Lord Buddha seated him
> Under a jambu-tree; with ankles crossed
> As holy statues sit—and first began
> To meditate this deep disease of life.

He abandoned his princedom and went forth to serve not only man, but every living thing. For, said he:

> Life runs its rounds of living, climbing up
> From mote, and gnat, and worm, reptile and fish,
> Bird and shagged beast, man, demon, deva, God,
> To clod and mote again; So we are kin to all
> That is; and thus if one might save
> Man from his curse, the whole wide world should share
> The lightened horror of this ignorance
> Whose shadow is chill fear, and cruelty
> Its bitter pastime.

And the object of his service, however lofty and self-sacrificing it may have been, was not that through it he might learn the meaning of life, but that he might escape from the curse of it—be cured of this "deep disease of life."

Within certain limits, this has characterized religious service in the non-Christian religions. It is a discipline self-imposed in order that merit may be achieved. And where so regarded it degenerates easily into perfunctory charity or casual alms-giving. And the worst feature of this is that it degrades the idea of man. There are those who take advantage of it by professional beggary which provides both a living for the mendicant and flatters the vanity of the ostentatious benefactor. And the result of this almost inevitably is a degradation of the idea of God. There seems to be a canny justice in the fact that low estimates of man carry with them low estimates of God, or indeed a practical denial of Him. It is no accident that Buddhism is atheistic and escapist; for such features are not unallied to its doctrine of man and its prescribed attitudes toward him.

This, while condemned as heathen, is strangely suggestive of the modern paganism which calls itself "Scientific Humanism" and whose evangel is "Put your trust in science and have confidence in yourselves." This mood encourages a lofty humanitarianism until science begins to say what man is, regarded from the purely scientific view-point. And the

report the scientists give us about ourselves rather dampens our ardor for serving each other. Science does not establish or elevate our confidence in ourselves, nor does our knowledge of ourselves confirm our trust in science. Service to man which is merely self-discipline or simple egotism degrades the three parties to service named by James Russell Lowell—"himself, the hungry beggar and Me."

It is, we shall presently point out in more detail, the Christian religion that identifies service to man as service to God. In the meantime, let us observe that even Christianity has not been free from perversions of its high ideals of service. Monasticism and all other types of flight from the world—which means flight from the world of humankind, and mainly from human need—these escapes, even in the name of religion are psychologically perilous. Remoteness from the world of men creates ignorance, then suspicion, then distrust and finally actual contempt or hatred. And as these develop a barrier erects between us and God. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (1 John 4:20.) The fact is that monasticism avoided such a consequence by becoming in spite of itself a medium of education and practical service to the communities where its institutions were established. Wherever today the religious impulse exhausts itself in ivory-tower retirement, it runs the same risks of mental and moral stagnation. Perhaps Leonard Bacon has not put it too strongly:

> This was decreed by superior powers
> In a moment of wisdom sidereal:
> That those who dwell upon ivory towers
> Shall have heads of the same material.

The Christian ideal of service disavows the idea of merit or demerit attaching to the act. In this sense every ministry to man is an end in itself. In the picture Jesus gave us of the Great Assize, the surprise occasioned by reward and punishment for service performed or neglected is registered by both the good and the evil. "When saw we Thee"—and "when saw we Thee not," these are the astonished comments of the sheep and the goats. But while from the human view-point each act was an end in itself, from the view-point of the Righteous Judge it was more than that—each act was a service to God. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these, ye have done it unto me."

It is just at this point that the unique character of the Christian insight is to be discovered. If our service to man is our service also to God, than our service involves the discovery, cultivation and support of

those human qualities which are, at the same time, divine. How otherwise can we serve God? The operating-room and the Red Cross unit are not saving God's body from a ruptured appendix or a broken levee. They are—if they are touched with the authentic Christian understanding—ministering to God by touching the elements of God's spirit that reside within us. It is easy to lose sight of this.

And it carries with it the certain fact that those individuals who have been most burdened in service to others—those, this is to say, in whom our proposition is concreted—they have been surest of God. No dialectic could have convinced Jesus, or John Woolman, or William Booth that God was unreal. They discovered him afresh in every act of ministry.[1] On the contrary what sort of an idea of God would we expect from Heine? Matthew Arnold, in his poem "Heine's Grave," said:

> The Spirit of this world
> Beholding the absurdity of men,—
> Their vaunts, their feats,—let a sardonic smile,
> For one short moment wander o'er his lips.
> That smile was Heine!

And Goethe said, "He had every other gift, but wanted love." And Heine himself said: "I, too, might have died for the human race if I had not shrewdly suspected it was not worth it." That attitude stops the quest in which we seek to discover God, and puts out the eyes with which we see him.

We have already been at pains to describe these elements as our non-spatial and non-temporal qualities. They come to us now by a more familiar name—our spiritual natures. And that which makes Christian service truly Christian is its focus finally on the spirit of man. We are compelled to say that much that goes by the name of Christian service is, by this test, out of reach of that classification. That is why the Marxian dialectic is irreconcilable with the Christian way of life. Its ministry to material human needs and its contempt for spiritual want is properly projected against a background of atheism. It is not to be expected that under the prevailing deliberate irreligion of communist Russia the reality of God will be discovered by service to men.

And this directs us to the impulse by which our service to the spiritual nature of man is motivated. It, in turn, must be a spiritual motive and there is no mistaking what that is in the Christian tradition. It is love. It may be consanguinity perhaps, or enthusiasm for humanity, or even a cool rationalism that looks more like prudence than love. But it cannot

[1] Grenfell. Cf. Hocking, *Thoughts on Death and Life*, pp. 134, ff.

be other than love, essentially. All Christian service is the issue of love. "This is my commandment unto you, that ye love one another." "He that saith, I know him (the reality of God) and keepeth not his commandment (service to man or love to one another) is a liar and the truth is not in him. But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him" (1 John 2:4, 5). All our service must have this reference if it is to be Christian and an avenue to the understanding of God.

At this point a warning is pertinent in the presence of the clamor for social and economic change and the demand that the Christian testimony be unequivocal and the Christian Church unresting in its aid. It need not be argued here that the structure of our modern world in many respects is cruelly destructive of the spiritual nature of man. We are happily emancipated from the pious nonsense that poverty is prerequisite to piety. The blessedness of the poor is not poverty, it is the freedom from the insensitiveness that riches often invites. And the great wealth at one end of our economic order and the degrading poverty at the other, are both deadening to the life of the spirit. In the light of the possibilities that lie actually within our grasp for the banishment of poverty, it is little less than scandalous that the Christian leadership is generally so apathetic to the demand that we end economic tyranny and exploitation. One can speak with considerable vehemence on this subject—and many of us must. But there is one thing to which our enthusiasm for social and economic renovation and justice must not blind us. The Church—with its passion for service in these crucial times—must not become merely a reformist bureau or a political movement. Its life is grounded essentially in its theistic hypothesis—or more simply in its belief in God. It is that faith that must be kept visible above the world of change as a standard of reference for all that is to be done. If once it should allow its concern for human rights to obscure the meaning and value of the human spirit —if once its passion for social righteousness should drop below the level of the will of God, it will become infra-Christian and imperiled by all the errors that paganism and secularism commit.

We have been trying, up to this point, to argue first: that it is valid to expect a verification of the reality of God—which is metaphysical, by the experience of service to man—which is empirical; second, that the nature of man is such as gives a partial understanding of the nature of God; and third, that service which cultivates the divine or spiritual qualities in men is (a) the unique quality of Christian service as compared with other religious or non-religious service; (b) that to lose this emphasis

in our service is to lose the essential character of our ministry to humankind.

It remains to ask how this actually brings to us a sense of the reality of God. We do not need to return to the philosophical aspects of the reality of God. We may believe in an objective supreme value or being, somehow efficient in the control of the cosmic process, and best understood as a rational, purposive mind. Or we may think of Him as real in the sense that love personified is real. What we want to know is that at least one of the ways into the secret of God is service to his children.

Testimony supporting this would come from two sources, the server and the served. The experience of one who under the impulse of love rendered a needed service that ministered ultimately to the spirit of the beneficiary—that experience ought to validate God, as love. Equally, the one who ministered unto, feeling the uplift of spirit that loving service must produce, should experience a new validation of the fact of God as love. Not uniform, or constant. To assume that is to fall back into time-space measurements where love cannot feel at home. But in so far as spiritual powers have been cultivated and sensitized—unto each according to his measure of faith—there ought to be an apprehension of God as spirit.

First then, the effect of the service on the beneficiary. Let us refer to the life of Jesus. Is there any connection between the deity assigned to Jesus by a few scant references in the New Testament, and the service he rendered his generation? Such an affirmation would arise either through what he said of himself, or what an authority that could speak for him said about him, or from what he did. It is an interesting fact that one who for centuries has been regarded as uniquely divine said no single unambiguous word from which such a postulate might be drawn. Such an unusual title would presuppose an original statement that was both explicit and oft repeated, either from him or from another. The best we have from him is vaguely implicit. The best we have from another is isolated and uncertain. But to those who knew him best, he became God—the reality of God. Those that had seen him, had seen the Father.

If they philosophized about him in pompous and profound words, we know nothing of it. Later, Paul grew philosophical, but he had the phenomenon to explain that others had experienced. We are fairly well shut up to the idea that Jesus created the impression of love in action as he went about doing good, and that the reality of that experience found finally a formula that equated him with God.

We do not expect that many of us will be deified in recognition of our performance of spiritual ministries. We live in a sophisticated age. But the award of sainthood in the Roman church is suggestive of what an

earlier day did for Jesus. The distance between deification and canonization may be vast, but so far as they arise from the mood of the spirit they are of the same final essence. Each generation has had its servants who were to be remembered for spiritual ministries to mankind. Accordingly the Council of Trent teaches that "the saints who reign together with Christ offer up their own prayers to God for men. It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them and to have recourse to their prayers, aid and help for obtaining benefits from God." However much or little our assent to this statement, it reflects clearly the way in which service—by miracle—and what is more miraculous than the act that lifts the cosmic cloud that enshrouds our little life, and reveals clearly the God of the whole universe?—or by martyrdom which are the Catholic reasons for canonization—or by a cup of cold water—impresses the beneficiary as the love of God mediated through human agency.

But of equal, if not indeed of greater importance, is the effect of such ministry on the ministrant. To see God as real through an act performed upon us which nourishes the spirit within us, is not an unfamiliar experience. But what of experiencing God as real by our ministry itself? Here we come upon something that is difficult to understand. It is intelligible only to those who begin with the hypothesis that God is creative love in action. Whether one who denied that hypothesis could be led to affirm it by serving man may lie outside the possibility of proof; but that some do thus experience God has the validity of empirical fact.

If our service is voluntary action in the effort to enrich the spiritual faculties of another, is that not as near as we can get to sharing the creative functions of God? It involves self-imposed limitations in order that the creative act may not be egoism.

> They cannot heal who have not suffered much
> For only sorrow, sorrow understands.
> They will not come for healing at our touch
> Who have not seen the scars upon our hands.

It is this discipline, self-imposed, for the enrichment of others that is the essence of redemption; and so far as it is possible for us to participate in the redemptive purposes of God, it must be through this channel. When Kepler said, "O God, I think Thy thoughts after Thee" he was the astronomer turned philosopher. But those of us who can never be at home amid the aching distances of interstellar space, or the crepuscular half-lights of philosophy can say with equal piety and devotion, "Lord, I do Thy works with Thee." In this experience we have the three participants of every act of Christian service *really* present—"Himself, the

hungry beggar, and Me." Such fellowship need not be argued with those who have rejoiced with those who rejoice, and wept with those who weep.

If this then is true, the testimony to the reality of God is as ubiquitous as human need, and its variety without limit. God is to be seen in every one we see, for there is none that can claim exemption from spiritual weakness. It makes the quest for God both novel and adventurous. Suppose our lives were animated by the vital faith that every person we meet is a bush aflame with God. It is our refusal to see this in man that makes it difficult to see God at all. Or, to reverse it, the denial of God goes with the refusal to serve man. For that means we serve ourselves only, and become ourselves the object of our own worship, whether we be a philosopher in a cloister or a wanderer in the street.

We have been trying to keep our idea of service as lofty as our ideal of the reality of God. It is not easy. Service so readily yields to the blight of habit, and so often we take out in talking what we should do in serving. Chesterton in his autobiography has caught it whimsically in a poem of which a verse will suffice:

> The Christian Social Union here
> Was very much annoyed.
> It seems there is some duty
> Which we never should avoid,
> And so they sing a lot of hymns
> To help the unemployed.

That sort of thing holds no promise of lifting the veil that shrouds the mystery of God. It uncovers rather the unreality and pretense of much of our Christian enterprise. And it puts up to us the very practical demand that we give ourselves to the demonstration of God that the humblest can make, and the humblest can understand.

So after all our wanderings through the wilderness of this discussion, we return at last to the point from which we set forth—an assumption that it is possible to discover one thing as real by doing something for something else. But we have found out that these two somethings are after all not discrete or alien. We are in some mysterious way and uncalculable measure a part of the unity which is God. That cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple (not of an exploiter or an egoist) is given unto him. And that same cup is none the less received from him. Received from him—given to him; and thus giver and receiver and God are united in a compact which is as real as the thirst or as the assuaging

draught. This is the Christian insight which will stand inviolate for all those who give themselves in service to humanity.

"Know man," says America's aged laureate, Edwin Markham, in a poem entitled "The Deep of God":

> Know man and you will know the deep of God;
> For I who cry my wonder over life,
> Am I not part of That behind it all?

REALITY IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS

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I VALUE highly the privilege and the honor you fellow-alumni have granted me on this annual gathering at our loved Crozer. It is the home where love and confidence and loyalty abide. Accordingly, it is impossible for us this evening to join the chorus of post-World War writers and speakers who have been reminding us that since that nightmare old concepts have been so shattered that we must reconstruct society on new standards. Personally, I have not been much impressed by the evidence they adduce.

But, admitting the fact of change, the problem is to gauge its rapidity and extent. Modern photography illustrates how a snail may appear to move with the speed of a bird and a swallow slow its flight to the pace of a tortoise. The real problem is to psycho-analyze the theorist. Every observer has some defect of vision. Some are myopic. They detect movement, but do not know what it is that moves. They know that the world has become black; that great social and political changes have occurred recently. Abundant literature is evidence of myopic vision. A short-sighted man lost his hat in a gust of wind and chased it. "What are you doing there?" shouted a woman from a neighboring cottage. "Getting my hat," he replied. "Your hat!" exclaimed the woman, "that's our black hen you're chasing."

Near-sighted men are not the only interpreters of history. Telescopes and microscopes produce far-sightedness in observers. The telescopist lives among the nebulæ; the microscopist among the infusoria. They are at home in the remote in space and time. The infinitely big and the infinitesimally small distract attention from daily human experience of the commonplace. Dr. Roy K. Marshall, professor of astronomy at Wilson College, recently remarked: "Human beings are lucky when they look at the stars with their naked eyes. Planets, stars, and the Milky Way lose much of their romance and beauty when seen through a telescope." The contrast is strongly put by Irvine A. Wheeler in a recent issue of *The Christian Century:*

> He gazed into the greatest telescope
> And saw the far-flung universe unfold;
> He peered into the finest microscope
> And watched the wonders of a strange-celled world;

He split and saw the atom's mystery
And watched the spectrum's shadows glow and dim.

. . . . . .

He saw all things—and yet did not see
The stranger beggar's hand held out to him.

To be sure, there has not been, and is not now such a physicist, but the lines approximately describe much of our recent literature. It gives false perspective due to media of interpretation.

Again, writers of creative fancy and romantic feeling weave the facts described by ethnologists and physicists into tapestries that æsthetes hang on memory's walls to entertain guests. They live so realistically in the region of romance, that they are disposed to believe the creations of their own fancy. They remind of four-year-old Frances who came running to her mother, burying her face in the mother's skirts. The astonished mother asked the cause of terror. Frances replied, " Oh, mamma, I was telling myself a story I was making up, and there were wolves in it." You know the type. They are among our " best sellers." However, they usually hide in the skirts of their own metaphysics.

But near-sighted and far-sighted and romantic theorists behave as ordinary mortals, and they use the familiar words true and false, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong. There would be no literature without these concepts. It is needless here to allude to theories of origin of these ideas. Especially is it unnecessary to trace the history of the moral idea in the race, or in any portion of it. Nor is it pertinent now to discuss the philosophical theories of ethics. The reality in ethics is that some kind of conduct that is both the expression of a good will and at the same time a means to a good end is the common heritage of the race. This reality is the most perplexing problem to reflective thought. For man is a puzzle to himself. He has always been trying to locate himself in the universe. He finds no suitable companionship in what is below him; he believes that he is somehow akin to what is above him; he covets the above rather than the below; he has strange feeling of restraint; he resents the thwarting of his desire to know; he listens to the voice that challenges inhibition; he makes the discovery; he hears in consequence the haunting voice, " Man, where art thou? " The picture-story in Genesis has been retold in every nursery since the dawn of human history. And from that day to this, his answer has given us the noblest and most tragic literature in every civilization. The problem has been more acute and baffling, because it has been always associated with the idea of God. But it is the idea of good that conditions the idea of God. Belief in the good is more imperious than belief in God. Socrates, because of his value of the good, bowed the

gods out of Olympus. Comte, because of his regard for science as the good, declared that "science would finally conduct God to the frontier and bow him out with thanks for his provisional services." The Frenchman was more effervescent and not so wise as the Greek, nor was his god quite as compelling as the *daimon* of Socrates, nevertheless he rendered a service to ethics when he became the foster-father of our contemporary scientific Humanists. In the interests of human welfare he transferred emphasis from theology to sociology. He was as impatient of a theological Ultimate, as his successors are of a metaphysical Ultimate. Our contemporary ethical idealistic pragmatists call upon speculative thinkers to make "devotion, piety, love, beauty and mystery as real as anything else," and cease searching for Ultimate Reality. But as long ago as the writer to the Philippians, one rather competent thinker believed such virtues to be real. "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

Here is the reality of human nature. Men love and hate; they are loyal and they are treacherous; they speak the truth and they lie; they trust and they betray trust; they hope and despair; they die in joy and they die in agony. These are experiences in time, and they must be honestly faced. The problems are in time; their solution must be in time. Because we live in time, we live in a world of change, but all the vicissitudes of past history, great and small, frequent and occasional, have not changed the facts that occasion ethics theoretical and practical.

Not long ago in an address before the British Association, Sir Josiah Stamp, commenting on the contemporary change in social and economic life, remarked that if we are to continue to live with change we must master it. To learn to *master* it: that is the task of the ethical will, after intellect has discovered the way, and motives sufficiently strong have become habitual. And men have been learning, and have made permanent gains. Permanency is found in ethics as nowhere else. Egypt of the pyramids is buried beneath the sand, the Book of the Dead lives; Khammurabbi is a name for antiquarians, his laws are in force today; Confucius is entombed, his golden rule guides the conduct of millions; Moses lies in an unknown grave, his moral ideal now binds the conscience of Jew and Christian; physical glories of pre-Christian Greece and Rome are being excavated from the débris of centuries, Epicurean and Stoic ethics have entered into the blood-stream of modern European civilization. Amid the rise and fall of successive empires, and accompanying changes in economic and social life, reflective thought has controlled

instincts and sublimated passion into sentiment and made more certain the conviction of one who nineteen hundred years ago had seen more changes in his lifetime than any modern man has seen: "The world (the social order) is passing away, and the desire for it; but he that does the will of God abides forever." The master of change endures; changes are inevitable in a temporal world.

Nevertheless, our experiences are so immediate, that the kind of change that has occasioned the political and industrial upheavals of the last one hundred years has been so contemporaneous as to appear unprecedented. Inevitably, modified philosophies appear to match the facts. These seem new because the data with which they work are new. In fact, however, the controlling theories of our immediate past and present are implicit in Greek thinking of pre-Platonic days. Pragmatism as an attitude, rather than theory, can claim the remark of Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things," as source and support of relativistic doctrine.

The exposition of Bergson, in opposition to mechanistic evolutionary theories, rests upon the maxim of Heraclitus, "Everything changes." The idea of evolution itself is an old philosophic thought, but became a fixed scientific principle through nineteenth century observation and induction. In some respects Darwin's *Origin of Species* caused more dismay than Germany's invasion of Belgium. To many its consequences have been more disastrous. Those that accepted the idea of evolution, but could not assent to mechanism, hailed Bergson as an intellectual and moral savior. Ingenious in argument, lucid in style, charming in delivery, and supported by an amazing knowledge of biology and psychology, he rescued evolution from mechanistic determinism. His championship of freedom of the will and of an *élan vital* that made a becoming process inevitable brought comfort to those perplexed by the revolutionary change in the thought-world. Bergson's "becoming" is the modern equivalent of an ancient idea, "everything is in flux."

These now familiar ideas, evolution, relativity, becoming, are portrayed by wealth of facts supplied by ethnographic, historical telescopic and microscopic exploration impossible to the ancient Greeks. In phraseology what seemed true to Heraclitus and Protagoras seems doubly true today. Relativity in antithesis to the absolute; change in contrast with permanence, are guides in opposing schools of thought. They are dominant in educational theory, including ethics. Once the exhortation was for increasing faith in absolute ideals; now it is for increasing faith in relative ideals. Theocratic authority has given way to sociocratic authority. A chance majority in an election is construed as a mandate from Demos. The standard, if there is one, is as movable as new levels reached by

human achievement. This fact may be granted, but it is equally true that a relatively fixed standard has acted as pedagog to keep a minority out of bad company until the higher level had been reached. For relativity in ethics is of the nature of ethics. It is not dependent on any metaphysical absolute. It is a fact of every-day experience. A friend called on her neighbor whose two sons were expected to arrive home from the penitentiary the next day. She rejoiced with her friend on release of her sons, but was eager to find out why they were freed so soon, for they had been sent up for ten years. The proud mother explained that three years had been deducted on account of good behavior. "Sure," said the sympathizing neighbor, "'tis a God's blessing that you have two such good boys."

Life of successive changes, in a purposive world, in a life of becoming, demands faith in both the relative and in the absolute. The requirement upon those that are masters in it is intelligence enough to distinguish things that differ, and resolution enough to follow the preferred right. Increasing faith in the relative alone leads to too eager adoption of the untried; increasing faith in the absolute alone may justify intellectual stagnation, acquiescence in enthroned wrong, and moral torpor. Human society may be compared to an ocean on which there are fogs and storms, and individuals are tramp steamers freighted with valuable cargo. An incident that is said to have recently occurred illustrates. The fog was thick. The chief officer of a steamer was peering over the side of the bridge. Unexpectedly he saw a man leaning over a rail only a few feet away. "You confounded fool," roared the officer, "what do you think your ship is doing? Don't you know that I have the right of way?" Out of the fog came the answer, "This ain't no blink'n ship, guv'ner. This ere's a light'ouse." The sea-faring man has his absolute by which he steers. The North Star is fixed for the traveler, notwithstanding that it has been calculated that it moves six inches in a year. It is therefore, relative, but absolute enough for men living nine thousand years hence to find their way about as we do, even though the North Star has moved a mite. Accordingly, it is easy to believe that as long ago as Abram's time the human conscience asked, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth be just?" and a positive answer expected. It is not hard to believe that the standard took literary form in Mosaic days, whatever its precise extent. By that star the Hebrews found their moral direction, and gave classic expression to it in the Fifteenth Psalm. It is not hard to believe that the ethical ideals of all pre-Christian and contemporary non-Christian civilizations, however sanctioned, Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Greek, Roman and Hebrew, became fixed, not in a code, but in a person, so that Paul

could make the astounding assertion, that the world will be judged in righteousness by *a man* whom God has ordained. The saying of Protagoras that generic man is the measure of all things has become individualized in One who is not only the Jesus of history, but Lord of the conscience and the Christ longed for by seekers after good.

The reality in Christian ethics is the reality of a Person that has made it possible for all who know him well to make him the absolute in morals. For ethics to be real must be exemplified in human experience. To illustrate, and at the same time to prevent some metaphysical Hercules from lifting from solid earth, I wish to compare and contrast an ethical nontheist with an ethical Christian theist.

The scientist felt himself called, if he had used religious language, to his profession, as Paul felt called to his work. At the early age of thirty-one his ambition was to "give a new and healthier direction to all Biological Science." December 31, 1856, he wrote: "To smite all humbugs, however big; to give a nobler tone to science; to set an example of abstinence from petty personal controversies, and of toleration of everything but lying; to be indifferent as to whether the work is recognized as mine or not, so long as it is done: are these my aims? 1860 will show." Not only 1860, three years later, but the close of a long and turbulent life, showed how resolutely he maintained the aims that guided him in his professional career. His faith in his scientific mission was tested by perils comparable to those faced by Paul for his religious faith. To ascertain the truth, the scientist hazarded disease in tropical climates, dangers on high seas, attacks from savages; experienced the jealousy of older fellow workers of international fame, and the sneers and scorn of theologians of high repute; suffered almost constant pain from various physical ills, and was subject to periodic attacks of depressing melancholy. Yet he persisted as the persuasive evangelist of biological evolution. And to him, his message was an evangel. He believed that it gave a nobler tone to science; that it would raise the standard of popular education; improve the condition of the working classes; give a surer foundation for ethics. His conviction prompted these oft-quoted words: "Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the great truth that is embodied in the Christian conception of entire surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you will learn nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I have resolved at all risks to do this." [1]

[1] *Life and Letters of Thomas H. Huxley,* by Leonard Huxley, Vol. I, p. 235.

This natural scientist accepted ethics as more real than its theistic support. He thought the dogmas of theism and of immortality mischievous. Yet he wrote: "The more I know intimately of the lives of other men (to say nothing of my own), the more obvious it is to me that the wicked does not flourish nor is the righteous punished. But for this to be clear we must bear in mind what almost all forget, that the rewards of life are contingent upon obedience to the *whole* law—physical as well as moral—and that moral obedience will not atone for physical sin, or *vice versa.*

"The ledger of the Almighty is strictly kept, and every one of us has the balance of his operations paid over to him at every minute of his existence. . .

"The absolute justice of the system of things is as clear to me as any scientific fact. The gravitation of sin to sorrow is as certain as that of the earth to the sun, and more so—for experimental proof of the fact is within reach of us all—nay, is before us all in our own lives, if we had but the eyes to see it." [2]

Hear again this revealing autobiographical sketch written to Charles Kingsley in reply to a letter of sympathy received on the occasion of the death of his first-born child at the age of four. "Kicked into the world a boy without guide or training, or with worse than none, I confess to my shame that few men have drunk deeper of all kinds of sin than I. Happily, my course was arrested in time—before I had earned absolute destruction—and for long years I have been slowly and painfully climbing, with many a fall, towards better things. And when I look back, what do I find to have been the agents of my redemption? The hope of immortality or of future reward? I can honestly say that for these fourteen years such a consideration has not entered my head. No, I can tell you exactly what has been at work. *Sartor Resartus* led me to know that a deep sense of religion was compatible with the entire absence of theology. Secondly, science and her methods gave me a resting-place independent of authority and tradition. Thirdly, love opened up to me a view of the sanctity of human nature, and impressed me with a deep sense of responsibility.

"If at this moment I am not a worn-out, debauched, useless carcass of a man, if it has been or will be my fate to advance the cause of science, if I feel that I have a shadow of a claim on the love of those about me, if in the supreme moment when I looked down into my boy's grave my sorrow was full of submission and without bitterness, it is because these agencies have worked upon me, and not because I have ever cared whether

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

my poor personality shall remain distinct forever from the All from whence it came and whither it goes.

"And thus, my dear Kingsley, you will understand what my position is. I may be quite wrong, and in that case I know I shall have to pay the penalty for being wrong. But I can only say with Luther, *'Gott helfe mir, Ich kann nichts anders.'*

"I know right well that ninety-nine out of one hundred of my fellows would call me atheist, infidel, and all the other usual hard names. As our laws stand, if the lowest thief steals my coat, my evidence (my opinions being known) would not be received against him.

"But I cannot help it. One thing people shall not call me with justice and that is—a liar. As you say of yourself, I feel that I too lack courage; but if ever the occasion arises when I am bound to speak, I will not shame my boy.[3]

"I have spoken more openly and distinctly to you than I ever have to any human being except my wife."[4] This is the ethical portrait of a professed agnostic as to the existence of God and as to immortality. In contrast to the actual judgments of the majority of the Christian clergy concerning him, it is easy to understand his comment to a friend: "I respect piety, and I hope I have some after my own fashion, but I have a profound prejudice against the efflorescent form of it."[5]

I will not debate the question whether Huxley's morality was not more theistically grounded than he was willing to admit, for he believed in social as well as biological heredity. I wish only to call attention to the reality of ethics in the professedly non-Christian contemporary world.

It is in this world that Christian ethics must be theoretically formulated and practically demonstrated. The earliest Christian group so conceived themselves. They were in the world, but not of the world. The smaller group had its ethics within a larger group with different moral standards. Both had some standard in common, but the Christian had a theism that included personal immortality. But it was not philosophical theism. It was practical experiential attachment to a Person, so that the Pauline exhortation, "Have this mind in you, which was also in Christ

[3] The occasion arose at the celebrated meeting at Oxford, when the scientist gave the stinging rebuke to the Bishop, who cared little for the scientific fact, but much for ecclesiastical prestige: "I asserted—and I repeat—that a man has no reason to be ashamed of having an ape for his grandfather. If there were an ancestor whom I should feel shame in recalling it would rather be a man—a man of restless and versatile intellect—who, not content with an equivocal success in his own sphere of activity, plunges into scientific questions with which he has no real acquaintance, only to obscure them by an aimless rhetoric, and distract the attention of his hearers from the real point at issue by eloquent digressions and skilled appeals to religious prejudice" (*Ibid.*, p. 199, report according to John Richard Green).

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 238.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

Jesus," had response in lives that knew what he meant. This mind of Christ is the distinctive quality of Christian ethics. It included the hedonistic and utilitarian values of the larger group, plus an affectional quality not found in Epicurus and Epictetus. The center is not self, however urgent the demand for self-improvement, unless self be sanctified for the sake of others. The purpose of self-sanctification is not to assure an environment of golden streets and gates of pearl, but a citizenship that is clean and devises no lie. This ethical goal was set by the smaller group in a world that thinks and acts in terms that justify goals more immediate and more satisfying to temporal needs. And the Christian group had these more immediate and temporal goals also. It is not strange that it had difficulty in reconciling the imperious demands of social justice with the equally compelling demand of forgiveness of the penitent sinner—a moral paradox tersely phrased, " That he himself might be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Christ."

The paradox is resolved by the words " in Christ." In this purely personal relationship there is a spontaneity of conduct that depends neither on the example of Jesus, nor his words, for guidance in specific acts. To search the records for a command of Jesus, or for his example, is to lower the standard to the level of morally benumbing casuistry, as the history of the Christian church attests. But Jesus as the expression of God's love toward penitent wrong-doers gives an affectional quality to acts that law conceived by both moralist and physicist cannot do. This distinguishes the evangelism of Charles Kingsley from the evangelism of Huxley. The latter emphasized law and justice; the former preached grace and forgiveness. The scientist sought first the intellectual welfare of his fellows; the religionist sought primarily his moral welfare. Affection is more powerful than argument in moral regeneration. But the contrast must not be too sharply drawn. For love of wife and children constrained Huxley in his moral climbing; he did not debate whether it was his love for them, or their love for him, that was the constraining force. In the early Christian group, the love of Christ constrained; and exegetes have paid too much attention to grammar, by debating whether the genitive is objective or subjective. I think that our own Professor Enslin is right when, in his *Ethics of Paul,* he suggests that the phrase " in Christ " makes the grammatical debate needless. The quality of love was such as could not have been imagined apart from Christ. It was both their love for him and his love for them that constrained. The word constrained has no imperative in it, as though they were under pressure of which they were conscious. They were not under Christ, but in him, so that their action was their own and yet his. They were in him; he was in them. He was

as though he were atmosphere in which they lived. They were as unaware of pressure from without as we are in our physical atmosphere, though it presses upon us about fifteen pounds to the square inch. Their conduct was as spontaneous and natural as breathing. This was actual at first. But their environment induced inevitably a blurred image of the Christ. They became aware of a double personality within, so that there was a question in practical ethics as to what was the mind of Christ. Hence, there arose a hesitancy to pronounce judgment on others, or even on self, lest they claim the prerogative of judicial decision in the name of Christ. Here was a humility that is absent from those that so readily define what is and what is not Christian. The affectional quality of Christian ethics forbids censoriousness, and prevents judgment before the time of judgment. This affectional quality is immortalized in Paul's hymn to love—good will in action. It was exemplified in the first two centuries by groups, which, to use the language of Origen in his reply to Celsus, " Compared with the communities among whom they dwell, the communities of Christians are as lights in the world." This was the reality in the creative period of the Church. This reality was eclipsed by the philosophical Christ of the third and fourth centuries, by the ecclesiastical Christ of the pre-Reformation period, by the theological Christ of the post-Reformation period; but only eclipsed. The ethical Christ of the creative period shed his uplifting rays through all succeeding generations, and is coming to clearer noonday brightness as his mission is becoming more clearly understood.

To change the figure, as Raphael's masterpieces have been painted over by inferior imitators, but have been restored by skill of later lovers of art with chemical devices known to them, so the Christ of the New Testament has been recovered by the patient industry and skill of historical investigators, whose motive has been to let common folk see the face of him whom having not seen they love. The reality of Christian ethics may be found in the groups to which you minister the gospel of grace daily. You have met them. They have a quality of life inexplicable apart from him whose spirit they breathe. This specific Christian quality is acquired in the kind of church Huxley described in a letter to Spencer:

" I suppose it is universally agreed that it would be useless and absurd for the State to attempt to promote friendship and sympathy between man and man directly. But I see no reason why, if it be otherwise expedient, the State may not do something towards that end indirectly. For example, I can conceive of the existence of an Established Church which should be a blessing to a community. A Church in which, week by week, services should be devoted, not to the iteration of abstract

propositions in theology, but to the setting before men's minds of an ideal of true, just and pure living; a place in which those who are weary of the burden of daily cares should find a moment's rest in the contemplation of the higher life which is possible for all, though attained by so few; a place in which the man of strife and of business should have time to think how small, after all, are the rewards he covets compared with peace and charity. Depend upon it, if such a Church existed, no one would seek to disestablish it."[6]

It is Christ motivating the Church that makes Christian ethics real in the sense of fact in social experience, and real in the sense of conformity to truth in philosophy.

[6] *Life and Letters of T. H. Huxley,* by Leonard Huxley, Vol. I, p. 386.

MYSTICISM AND REALITY

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To the modern scientific mind the word "mysticism" suggests largely mistiness, or a vague, outworn impractical thing of the dark ages that may befit the "impractical East" with its gloom and passivity but not worthy of attention of the active man who is up and doing. A mental reaction of repulsion and often of disgust characterizes his attitude, even though he may let the mystic go undisturbed provided the latter will keep within his own limits. But enduring all the criticisms that have been piled upon him, the mystic has gone on with his life—often not without derision of the pity that has been showered upon him—deeply conscious of his own abiding inner strength and power. He knows what he is about and the reality he has seen and experienced gives his life a certain strength and dignity. The heart of his assurance, he knows, can never be touched and refuted. So, though the modern world would rather be without him, it finds that it cannot ignore him. All philosophy and science have been powerless against him. The amount of literature that has lately appeared on the subject of mysticism is an evidence of a renewed interest to search out and understand what it is that has made it so deathless.

It is well to remind ourselves at the outset that the mystic experience is by no means limited to the religious mystic alone. It has analogies in the experiences of the ordinary life of reason. A study has been dry and then like a flash there is a sudden light and the whole subject takes shape and meaning, and one feels, not that he has made it to be so, but it was there all the time only waiting to be seen. The poet has experiences that often have a mystic ring. The following lines from Whittier will illustrate:

> So sometimes comes to soul and sense
> The feeling which is evidence
> That very near about us lies
> The realm of spiritual mysteries.
> The sphere of the supernal powers
> Impinges on this world of ours.
>
> —*The Meeting.*

Certain aspects of nature seem to have a peculiar power of awakening similar mystic moods. "I never lost the consciousness of the presence of God until I stood at the foot of the Horseshoe Falls, Niagara. Then I lost

him in the immensity of what I saw. I also lost myself, feeling that I was an atom too small for the notice of the Almighty God." Doctor Bucke reports an experience of an onset of cosmic consciousness in his own person: "I did not merely come to believe, but I saw that the universe is not composed of dead matter, but is on the contrary a living Presence; I became conscious in myself of eternal life." The ecstasy of Plotinus is of a non-religious type. Here is another example from Plato: "He who has been disciplined to this point in Love, by contemplating beautiful objects gradually, and in their order, now arriving at the end of all that concerns Love, on a sudden beholds a beauty wonderful in its nature. This is it, O Socrates, for the sake of which all former labors were endured. . . For such as discipline themselves upon this system, or are conducted by another beginning to ascend through these transitory objects which are beautiful, toward that which is beauty itself, proceeding as on steps from the love of one form to that of two, and from that of two, to that of all forms which are beautiful; and from beautiful forms to beautiful habits and institutions, and from institutions to beautiful notions; until, from the meditation of many notions, they arrive at that which is nothing else than the notion of the supreme beauty itself, in the knowledge and contemplation of which at length they repose." (*Symposium.*) The æsthetic feelings of the musician and the artist often reach the heights of mystic experience. Human life abounds in sporadic types of mystic consciousness.

The Mystic from Without

Of those who have come to a study of mysticism with an open mind as they claim, we will first deal with the psychologists. Their approach is from without and purely external. Viewing it, as some of these do, purely from a pathological standpoint, they study its symptoms. Any appearance of morbid outward phenomenon is hailed with great joy for they believe that they have found the clue to the understanding of mysticism. Ribot reduces mysticism to a disease of the will. The mystic ecstasy is an ecstasy in repose wherein ideas alone reign, and these ideas are ordinarily abstract or metaphysical; movements are suppressed. There is a sleep of the powers, and one idea absorbs all. He says that "if the normal psychic activity be compared to a psychic circulating capital, continually modified by receipts and expenses, . . (in the ecstasy) the capital is massed in one sum; diffusion becomes concentration, the extensive is transformed into intensive." Thus he finds that in the mystic state there is neither choice nor action, "since choice supposes the existence of that complex whole called the ego, which has disappeared." The personality

has been reduced to one idea, and hence there is no state which can be chosen. Consequently action is dried up in its source, and is annihilated. Personality is broken up by the independent life of one idea. Dissociation follows and there is a disintegration of the will. The mystic thus becomes victim, a helpless victim to the disease of the will. While he has thus found the secret of the mystic in simplification, one wonders whether after all he has not simplified the solution too much. In the case of the Hindu yogi, the ecstasy does not happen to him. He deliberately seeks after it through carefully prepared method, and he has a marvelous possession of the will. Again, the fact that one idea controls the mystic in his ecstasy does not thereby invalidate the experience. We need to ask further the quality and value of the idea before we can adequately pass any judgment on the case.

There are others who will associate the mystic experience with the high places in the organic rhythm of life. The ecstasy and the return to ordinary levels of life are regarded as unusually pronounced oscillation of the vital tone. Godfernaux pronounces mysticism to be a "hypertension" of vital energy. But this view is not satisfactory, for it disregards the part that the will plays in the mystic experience. Again we do not observe any periodicity, even if there should be any rhythm. Furthermore, one does not observe any depression after the elevation of the experience; but on the other hand each experience marks a new level of life, and the mystic life is a continued growth and development. The genuine mystic desires to do away with any such rhythm and longs for a continued experience of the Divine reality, and mystics through several years of discipline, at least some of them, do attain the end they desire. Finally it is a matter of experience that mystic moods often come when the vital tone is rather low. Many an ascetic has the ecstasy when his body has been reduced through mortification and fasting.

Leuba's approach to mysticism must also be classified as external, for he attends largely to what *happens* to the mystic. While he has drawn our attention to the moral ambition of the mystic, he finds that in the mystic trance certain organic desires are satisfied. According to him four needs or tendencies of human nature are satisfied in the mystic life. The first is the need for mental peace, for intellectual unity. This need is met not by reconciliation of opposed elements, nor by gaining of more general principles, but by elimination. The second is the need of an effective support. The intense need of moral help, of loving support generates in the mystic a keen and persistent sense of the presence of the great Comforter. The third is the tendency to organic enjoyment. The fourth is the tendency to the universalization of action, to ethical unity. In the

journey of the soul to God, Leuba finds marks of the two great periods observed in hypnosis, viz., the loss of muscular control and later the loss of sensory perceptions, only with the difference of the dominance of the feeling of love. The mystic ecstasy becomes a love trance in which the idea of God, or of Jesus, or of the Virgin takes the place of the hypnotizer. Though the ecstasy is a form of hypnosis it still satisfies the four needs. The Divine Love experienced in the ecstasy is but a satisfaction of the sex impulse, though there is nothing debasing in it. Leuba is thus led to an unsatisfactory conclusion because he is attending too much to the trance. He bases his conclusion on the purely external considerations of (1) the symptoms, physical and psychical, of sex excitement, (2) the expressions of the mystics in the language of the lovers, (3) the difficulty the mystics experience in regulating their sex impulse. A similar conclusion is also reached by Schroeder who maintains that mysticism is essentially erotomania.

Coe recognizes in the mystic trance a "transcending of self and realization of a larger spiritual order in which the mystery and contradiction of existence are solved." He explains this by reference to pure auto-suggestion. In analyzing the experience content of the trance he finds therein a relaxation from tension and also a narrowing of attention. The former gives a feeling of the transcending of self and the force of habitual auto-suggestion reenforces the experience. Thus the mystics bring back confirmations of their own creeds when they emerge from their trances. The mystics are so suggestible that they regard interpretations of the experience as actual experience. In Professor Coe again the content of mystical revelation is accounted for by the actual experience content of the trance. Coe and Leuba make the trance central and we may say even identify it with mysticism, and thus they have missed that which is essential in mysticism.

The above and all similar attempts to understand mysticism are unsatisfactory, for they deal with the accidents of mysticism, and forget the essential. Much extraneous matter is brought in, and to treat mysticism as if it were all pathology is mistaking the accident for the real. The identification of mysticism with magic (Probst-Biraben), or mental degeneration (Nordau), or hysteria (Janet), or disease of the will (Ribot), or instability of organic sensations (Maine de Biran) are all limited points of view. The external approach to mysticism is all vitiated by the thought that the organic causation of a state of mind is enough to discredit the value of the experience. It is a case of arguing from origin to value. In the words of William James, "To plead the organic causation of a religious state of mind, in refutation of its claim to possess superior

spiritual value, is quite illogical and arbitrary, unless one has already worked out in advance some psycho-physical theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinant sorts of physiological change." Again the classification of mystic experience under any general psychological law or category, as for example, the classification of the mystic experience as a phase of the uniting tendency in man (Leuba), is only to destroy that which is unique in the experience. While psychoanalysis has brought to light many of the nervous and other associations of the mystic experience, it tends to confound the psychical states of the mystic with the mystic himself and to make central that which is accidental. To attempt to explain the mystic phenomenon by appeal to any one particular impulse is to defeat itself, for it is one in which the whole man enters.

Mysticism has also been regarded as a philosophy. The monistic tendency of speculative mysticism expresses itself as a doctrine of the Abstract Universal. Royce regards mysticism as "a perfectly recognizable speculative tendency, observable in various ages and nations, and essentially characterized by the meaning that it gives to the ontological predicate," and he regards this type as the "historical" one. No doubt the mystics have attempted to define Being, but they have succeeded in doing so only in negative terms. An illustration of this is found in the *Neti, Neti* of Indian speculative mysticism. But Royce is not right in saying that the motive of the mystic is to define Being. In the words of Professor Hocking, "The mystic motive is not to define Being, but to do something which he has tried to differentiate from all processes of defining or speculating. His theoretical message is that there is practical cognition of the Absolute which philosophical knowledge fails to reach. Philosophy finds its real in the third person and not in the second." Again, mystics generally have regarded philosophy as a hindrance to their achievements and are impatient with discursive reasoning. To quote a saying of Eckhart, "So long as the soul has God, knows God, has knowledge about God, so long is she separated from God." Furthermore, even the negative definitions of Being as given to us by the mystics have been largely due to wrong conclusions. Their experience was beyond words, and inexpressible, and from this they concluded that the object of their experience was ineffable.

The Mystic Motive

We have found that the approach to the mystic from without does not account for the central fact of mystic passion and certainty. If we are to understand him at all we must look from within, and not from without. "One can never fathom an emotion or divine its dictates,"

writes William James, "by standing outside of it. . . Each emotion obeys a logic of its own and makes deductions which no other logic can draw." We must inquire into the motive that lies behind the mystic quest. Is the mystic motive distracted and confused? Does he seek for solitude and escape from the multiplicity of life? Does he seek for annihilation or enlargement of the self? Does he look for simplification by unification or elimination? Is the mystic motive a mere retreat and no more? How does he set about to achieve his end? These are the questions which, if we can answer, will give us a clue to the understanding of the mystic consciousness.

Recejac finds the mystic motive to be an ethical one. In spite of the tendency in mystics to quietism and solitude, they have been in general men of great ethical activity, and some of them specially as social workers. But it will be truer to say that their ethical activity is a result of their inner experience than that their inner experience is a result of their ethical activity.

Boutroux finds that the desire for the enlargement of one's personality through a loving participation with others of the common life together with union with God as the principle of this universal communion constitutes the idea which governs the mystic life. It seems to me the enlargement of one's personality is more a result of the mystic experience than the motive of it. It is as a result of his experience that he enters into the realization of that life in which he finds his own complete development in virtue of the development of other selves. Thus the realization of the fundamental oneness of a soul is the fruit and not the motive of the mystic life.

A study of the English Christian mystics reveals that the absorbing motive of the mystic quest has been the desire to become one with God and thus through a perfect love of Him come to a knowledge of Him. A passion for God and for Him only, not for his gifts, seems to be the driving motive of the mystic adventure. "We can do no more than behold Him, and rejoice with a high, mighty desire to be all united to Him, and rejoice in His loving, and delight in His goodness . . . and we shall see God face to face, homely and fulsomely," so writes Lady Julian of Norwich. The more learned Walter Hilton says, "The perfect contemplation as can be had in this life consisteth in knowing and perfect loving of God, so perfectly that he becometh ravished with His love, and so the soul for the time is become one with God," and adds, "Surely in this one-ing consisteth the marriages which passeth between God and soul, that shall never be dissolved or broken." Richard Rolle finds his end in the perfect contemplation of God wherein he is "knitted and oned

perfectly to God," and he expresses the joy of this union as follows: "A better dwelling-place no sweeter found I never, for it has made me and my love one, (and made) one out of two." A tinge of this note of escape is observed in Lady Julian when she writes, "Afore this time I had great longing and desire of God's gift to be delivered of this world and of this life; for oft-times I beheld the woe that is here, and the weal and the blessed being that is there."

How does the mystic set about realizing his end? The modern world exhorts us to find God about us. Day in and day out we are told to find God not in the private corners of our homes but in the slums. Find God in your neighbors and particularly in serving them; this is the modern cry. The mystic in contrast urges us to find God in ourselves. Find God not without, but within, is his cry. "He sitteth in our souls," says Julian, and adds, "In man's soul is his very dwelling." Writes Hilton, "It becometh thee to delve deep in thy heart for therein is Jesus hid." "He is in thee, though He be lost from thee." "This is His mercy also, that he would suffer Himself to be lost only there, where He may be found, so that thou needest not run to Rome nor Jerusalem to seek Him there, but turn thy thoughts into thy own soul where He is hid . . . and seek Him there."

The Mystic Pilgrimage

The journey of the soul is on no smooth and easy road. The morally pure alone can find Him, and so the mystic sets himself to a thorough, moral preparation. The inordinate love of himself and "the stinking rags of sin, as pride, envy, anger, covetousness, gluttony, sloth and luxury" are obstacles in reaching his goal. Through much labor and effort involving often a long period of years, he overcomes all selfishness and worldly desires. He orders his life with such severity that he is open to the charge of asceticism. By full trust and surrender in faith, the mystic attains purity of heart, so that "no image of bodily things can beguile him." Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This is the first stage in the mystic pilgrimage.

When the soul has been purged of all sin, it passes into a stage where through its inward eye it receives spiritual light. This illumination is a lifting of the consciousness from a self-centered to a God-centered world. The sense of selfhood still persists, but in relation to a God who is other than self. The perception of the infinite clears up the perception of the finite life. This stage may be compared to what Brother Lawrence calls the "practice of the presence of God." There is a growth in love, and all the discordant elements of life disappear. Walter Hilton

says, "This opening of the spiritual life is that lightsome darkness and rich naught that I spake of before, and it may be called purity of spirit and spiritual rest, inward stillness and peace of conscience, highness of thought and loneliness of soul, a living feeling of grace and retiredness of heart, the watchful sleep of the spouse and tasting of heavenly savour, burning in love and shining in light, the gate of contemplation and reforming in feeling."

Thus purified and illumined the soul reaches the final stage of the pilgrimage in which it becomes one with God. It is not common, but special, and is granted only as the soul is able to bear it. It is not to be enjoyed continually. Writes Julian, "Our soul is united to Him, unchangeable goodness; . . our soul is so fulsomely united to God of His own goodness, that between God and our soul may be right naught." Plotinus describes a similar oneness as follows: "Perhaps, however, neither must it be said that he sees, but that he is the thing seen, if it is necessary to call these two things, i. e., the perceiver and the thing perceived. But both are one; though it is bold to assert this. Then, indeed, the soul neither sees, nor distinguishes by seeing, nor imagines that there are two things; but becomes as it were another thing, and not itself. Nor does that which pertains to itself contribute anything there. But becoming wholly absorbed in deity, she is one, conjoining as it were centre with centre. For here concurring, they are one; but they are then two when they are separate." This stage in the mystic pilgrimage has been called "spiritual marriage" and it involves the perfect consummation of the love of God. Writes Richard Rolle, "Truly in contemplative men, there is a full sweet heat and the plenteousness of God's love abiding, from which a joyful sound is sent unto them with untrowed mirth." Several of these mystics experience spiritual visions and voices, which are momentary and inexpressible. Rolle had an experience of heat, song and sweetness. "Song I call it when in a soul the sweetness of everlasting praise is received with plenteous burning, and thought is turned into song; and the mind is changed into full sweet sound."

In this sense of union with Reality the mystics differ to a large degree as to the object with which they have become united. Some describe it as a characterless Absolute in which they have become lost once for all, and others as God, or Jesus, or Rama. Some seem to be united with an all-involving principle of unity. This raises a great difficulty for the student of mysticism, who is at a loss to know where the actual experience of the mystic ends and where his disputable inferences begin.

Thus the mystic pilgrimage is a growth in love, a deliberate fos-

tering of the inward tendency of the soul toward its source, and the end of love is achieved in union, or as Hilton would say, in "a perfect uniting and coupling together of the lover and love into one." It is a realization which says, "I live, yet not I, but God that liveth in me."

With Thy Sweet Soul, this soul of mine
Hath mixed as Water doth with Wine:
Who can the Wine and Water part,
Or me and Thee when we combine?
Thou art my greater self;
Small bounds no more can me confine.

—*Jalalu'd Din, "The Festival of Spring."*

The Mystic Achievement

The ineffable and transient character of the mystic experience have been brought as a charge against the mystics. But we need to remind ourselves that our own deep emotional experiences are also ineffable and transient. Who can express the quality of feeling that one experiences in listening to some fine music, or in viewing a beautiful landscape, or in watching a tropical sunset? Are not these experiences also transient? Even though transient, who can doubt the lasting impression and effect of the experiences in the life of the experient? May it not be that the emotion of the mystic experience is but an intense form of the emotional uplift of these other æsthetic experiences?

The tendency to passivity is another charge usually brought against the mystic. But we must remember that the mystic's retirement from activity is not due to any shirking or inability to face the burdens and responsibilities of life but to a sense of rising above them. He has seen beyond the temporal and so the temporal goods of life have no attraction for him. His life is now controlled by a superior attachment.

Again, the passivity is not the passivity of a lazy will. The serious moral preparation is an index of effort. There is an intense concentration on the object of his pursuit. Even in the act of self-surrender to the object he holds supreme, there is no relaxation but an active, conscious, deliberate effort to realize the value he holds dear. Further examination reveals that the mystics have laid stress on social duties and obligations. "The real achievements of Christian mysticism are to be seen in Saint Catharine of Sienna regenerating her native city, Joan of Arc leading the armies of France, Ignatius creating the Society of Jesus, or Fox giving life to the Society of Friends." Again the amount of literature that has come down to us from the hands of the mystics is also an indication of their activity.

The prominence given to feeling as against reason has laid the mystic open to much criticism. Santayana calls mysticism a normal disease in the life of reason. While the mystics have not emphasized the place of the intellect in their life, they have not disparaged reason. Mother Julian writes: "For only by our reason we may not profit, unless we have therewith evenly mind and love." She even calls upon the use of reason as a means of worshiping God. Walter Hilton speaks of reason as a "lanthorn" by which the soul may see spiritual things. But the mystic is very conscious of the limits of reason. The knowledge he claims is not achieved by the processes of the intellect.

A supreme fact of mystic achievement is that life has become unified. All the discordant elements of personal life disappear. The sense of incompleteness is replaced by a feeling of relief and peace. Life takes on order and unity. Not only in personal life but also in relation to the life of the universe, there is a feeling of organic unity. The mystic gets a view of the whole and he returns to his details of life with a realization of what each part plays in the whole. Limitations of space, time and reason are transcended and there is an immediate awareness of the nature of the whole.

There is also a renewal and enlargement of the self. The self has been made anew and transformed. A new infusion of vitality is observed. The influx of Divine Life has enhanced the mystic's life and new creative powers are noticed. Delacroix writes: "Its (mystic life) growth results in the transformation of personality; it abolishes the primitive consciousness of selfhood, and substitutes for it a wider consciousness; the total disappearance of selfhood in the divine, the substitution of a Divine Self for a primitive self."

A joyous optimism amidst all the evils of this life also characterizes the mystic achievement. He has "seen the good," and is therefore confident that "all will be made good." He is conscious of an "alliance with a Power by which all evil is prospectively conquerable." He knows that all things will work together for good in the end, and so he simply carries on, conscious of the power that has been his, because he has realized the heart of Reality. So wherever he is, we perceive an air of joy and freedom.

The Mystic Life

The mystic life is an active one, lived in the consciousness of God. His life is enriched with meaning, and is no mere mad rush for existence. Purpose and meaning are writ large in every aspect of his activity. Detailed routine of life is no more drudgery, but only a realization of

the true inner life. He feels himself an instrument in the hand of God, and this furnishes a motive and a power for his activities. "To be risen," says Madame Guyon, "the soul should be capable of all the acts which she performed before the time of her losses; and perform them without difficulty, since she performs them in God."

It is a life of opposites. The mystic is both a constitutionalist and a nonconformist. He abides by the traditions and authority of the organized body of believers, but he will not give up his right to immediate relations with God. He needs no intermediary. One also sees in the mystic a combination of the prophetic and the rational. Resignation and active effort characterize his moral life.

The mystic life is also characterized by alternation between work and worship. Writes Walter Hilton, "And it may fall out sometimes that the greater trouble thou hast exteriorly had in doing of thy active work, the more inflamed desire thou shalt afterward have to God and the more sight of God and spiritual things, through the grace of our Lord, in devotion when thou comest thereunto." Enriched by contact with reality the mystic descends with renewed vigor to the storm and stress of life, which in turn send him back to be replenished with strength and power.

The mystic quest is thus an adventure in life. Mysticism cannot be explained away by calling it magic, or hysteria, or a disease of the will, or hypertension of vital energy. These descriptions deal only with the accidents of mysticism. Neither can it be identified with any satisfaction of the sex impulse. Nor is it only a philosophy. It is immediate awareness of Reality, and a life in the consciousness of that Reality. It frees us from our partial and one-sided view, and enables us to see them from the point of view of the whole. It makes life complete and unified. Its emotional feature ministers to the inwardness and depth of religion, and thus is a healthy corrective to the tendency toward "the religion of pure reason." Allied with the rational will, it enables man to reach the summits of religious life and experience. It is also a healthy corrective of the tendency toward appeal to external authority in matters of religion. In spite of all the evil that disheartens us, it gives the only hope and stimulus to carry on in the battles of life. Finally it leads to life in its wholeness, a certain joy and peace, dignity and serenity, value and meaning without which life becomes mere existence. I conclude with a quotation from Eucken: "That with the upgrowth of spiritual life man is raised into a new world and participates in the totality of its life, is something of which we can gain no assurance from any

flight of speculation: conviction can come only from the fact that a life is developed which accomplishes the deliverance of man from the merely human, and, in doing so, by no means falls into the void. But such a development does appear in point of fact; indeed, it exhibits itself as the height of spiritual work both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. What is genuine and essential in religion is not a petting and pampering of the mere man with his craving for happiness; it is a removal of him into infinity, eternity, perfection; it is the winning of a new, wider, and purer existence from a new world."

BOOK REVIEWS

THE NEW ORIENT. Two volumes: Volume I, "The Near East." Editors: A. E. Haydon, Halford L. Hoskins, A. H. Lybyer, A. T. Olmstead, Martin Sprengling. Volume II, "The Far East." Editors: Arthur Upham Pope, Berthold Laufer, Quincy Wright, Walter E. Clark. Chicago: The New Orient Society. 1937. Pp. viii, 483; xii, 394. $5.00.

IN these volumes are assembled essays, first published in the *Open Court,* representing activities of the New Orient Society of Chicago, which was organized on April 19, 1930. The purpose of the Society was to "promote a better understanding of oriental life and peoples by centralizing on the cultural phases of the East rather than on its politics" (I, 2). If the dissemination of information will accomplish this desired end, then these volumes have made a good beginning.

The essays, forty-eight in all, have all been written by experts in the field, and in many cases are the most authoritative contribution on the subject to date. Such names as Sven Hedin, E. D. Ross, A. U. Pope, B. Laufer, R. Grousset, serve but to indicate the caliber of the authors in general. Sprengling, in volume and versatility, holds the field with five trenchant articles, as widely separated in interest as Turkey, Egypt, Africa and Arabia. "Mysterious Arabia Modernizes" (Vol. I, 277-312) presents *multum in parvo.* Marcus on Jewish Palestine, a study in becoming, gives one of the best sketches of the whole situation up to 1933. Grousset's sketch of Persian history is the illuminating resumé of a scholar. Laufer's five-and-a-half-page foreword to Volume II is suggestive. He implies that faith in a vindictive deity has had much to do with the sorry history of Europe. How far have the eternal rivalry and strife between Church and State, the endless chain of religious wars and persecutions, the massacre of heretics and dissenters been caused by theological concepts? His comparison of Chinese with Western culture, in the same foreword, is equally illuminating. Even to indicate the worthy articles in these two volumes would outrun our space. Reading and digesting them will surely aid toward the objective of the Society.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

A SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE JEWS. Salo Wittmayer Baron. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Three volumes. Pp. xiv, 377; x, 462; xii, 406. Price, Vols. I and II, each $3.75; Vol. III, $4.00. Volumes sold separately.

IN two volumes, 863 pages in all, the author has sketched the interrelation of the social and religious forces that played upon the Jewish people, or their forebears, from the time of the Habiri entrance into Canaan until the present day. In the third volume, in fine type, are segregated 173 pages of notes, 131 pages of bibliography and an Index of 102 pages. Needless to say these volumes represent an immense amount of work. It is noteworthy that the scholarship is sound and the perspective and the judgment are excellent.

The volumes are the enlargement of the "Schermerhorn Lectures" delivered at Columbia University in the spring of 1931. They present the first attempt at a comprehensive socioreligious history of the Jews. The author does not suggest that

all of his conclusions are final, but no one can escape the fact that the whole treatment is stimulating.

The history of the Jew has been devious and complex. In many countries he has played his part in all phases of life, from peasant to prince, from pauper to banker. He has mingled with all races, assimilating, absorbing, and still maintaining his identity. For more than two millenia he has been a wanderer among the nations, homeless, yet his solidarity has been paramount. In the process of the years Judaism has become a nation without territory or state. It is the long sweep of this varied history that Professor Baron has endeavored to interpret, and he has done it admirably. His mastery of a wide range of literature is in evidence on every page, to say nothing of the notes and the bibliography. As a Jew, naturally, he is *en rapport* with his theme, but he is the historian and not the propagandist. Much space, some three hundred pages, is devoted to the present problems of the Jewish people. On some of the problems that at the present time seem most urgent there is no forecast of probabilities. But on the things that lie deeper, the ability of the Jewish people to suffer and their amazing religious vitality, with the compensations that come from suffering, the author lays an essential emphasis. He is able to sing "a New Song."

I. G. MATTHEWS.

GERMANY'S NEW RELIGION: The German Faith Movement. Wilhelm Hauer, Karl Heim, Karl Adam. Translated by T. S. K. Scott-Craig and R. E. Davies. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 169. $1.50.

A SKETCH of Germany's new religion with a dialectical defense of it by Wilhelm Hauer occupies almost one-half of this volume. It is revelatory. The first sentence reads "The German Faith movement is as old as German history." At the close the author says, "We are convinced that there is no power capable of exorcising the evil except German Faith."

What is this German Faith? It is faith in the immediacy of human access to God (p. 49). Hence it rejects the whole conception of mediation, whether through a sacred person, a sacred book, or a sacred rite (p. 48), and it is avowedly anti-Christian. It is a faith in the realities of this world, in contrast to . . . those of Christianity (p. 53). The "ideal will of the nation" . . . has a divine origin, . . and is what the presence of God in the nation means to us (p. 58). This cannot be found in a sacred book, especially one that is of Semitic origin (p. 58). It is the embodiment of a German morality that will rank higher than that of Christianity (p. 60). There is much of idealism in the movement, also an insistence on national consciousness. Phrases such as, German morality, German soul, German genius, the profound depths of the German nature so dominate every page that one might wonder if a new species of *homo sapiens* had come to birth. Hauer, a brilliant student, a one-time Christian missionary in India, now a professor in Tübingen, is a disciple of Eckhart and of Nietzsche, and finds the superman in the German nation. One might ask if this German Faith movement does not show some of the characteristics of a defense mechanism of those suffering from an inferiority complex? At any rate, however correctly Hauer may estimate the "profound German nature" it is questionable if he has any clear insight into Semitic characteristics (pp. 71-84).

Heim, a Lutheran minister and professor at Tübingen since 1920, registers an emphatic dissent from Hauer's philosophy. He holds that Hauer's mystical union with God is impossible to man "because the desire of our hearts is in opposition

to the will of God" (p. 110). Hence "we men have no influence in the matter" (p. 113). Salvation is by mediation and is from God alone. Here we have a Barthian edition of Luther.

Adam, also from Tübingen, a Catholic theologian, is constructive. His thesis is twofold. Human nature, on its biological side, has not in its inmost kernel been touched by original sin. It has in it the spark of the divine and is capable of high idealism (pp. 161, 162). But "on its superterrestrial side human nature is corrupt" (p. 163). Hence in affairs of this world man is very much alive by nature, but humanity becomes alive to God only as the mystery of God is revealed in the passion of Jesus (p. 163).

This small book is indeed revelatory. Here are three schools of theology, the Catholic, the modern Lutheran and the German Faith movement.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

THE DIVINE IMPERATIVE: A Study in Christian Ethics. Emil Brunner, Professor of Theology in Zurich. English translation by Olive Wyon. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. Pp. 728. $7.50.

THE original German version of this work was published in 1932 under the title, *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer Protestantisch-theologischen Ethik.* It was well to change the title in publishing an English translation, for a book in English under the title, "The Commandment and the Orders: Outline of a Protestant Theological Ethic" would be unlikely to appeal to many readers.

Professor Brunner is well known as one of the leading exponents of the Barthian theology. The present volume is a clear indication that he does not see eye to eye with Karl Barth in all theological matters. Barth would never have written this work, for he has taken the position that ethics is foreign to theology. "God is in Heaven and man on earth," he says, and consequently "a system of ethics which pretends to know and to establish the commandment of the Creator usurps the throne of God, poisoning the sources of faith." (Quoted by Adolf Keller in *Religion and Revolution,* p. 87). Brunner agrees that theology must not lean on philosophy which is man-made, and he maintains with Barth that theology is grounded in a divine revelation. The source of the Christian ethic is in the commandment or will of God through which alone the Christian can discover what is good and what constitutes duty. So far Brunner is certainly on stronger ground than Barth, for a theology that is unrelated to human behavior would be little better than an academic exercise.

The divine command is contained in the Word of God, but not the Word of God in the sense of laws of God recorded in the Bible. Neither is the divine command to be equated with the voice of conscience. It is rather the voice of the personal God who speaks to him who exercises faith in God, and is justified by faith. When a man of faith hears the voice of God speaking to him, he will have no room for doubt as to the source of the voice. Faith and the will of God are inseparable in this experience. It is therefore an experience only for those whom God had called, and called in a concrete way. God allows sinful man, despite his sinfulness, to serve him, to carry out his will.

Brunner repeatedly stresses the personal character of the divine command. His attitude toward men is always personal. It is expressed in such a word as "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" and "I have called thee by thy name, thou art

mine." The corollary of course is that man should respond to God personally. Some types of philosophical ethics are couched in impersonal terms, but the Christian ethic implies a concrete personal service here and now. Since man is naturally sinful, and God alone is good, only God can be the author of good conduct. He accomplishes that through the Holy Spirit who begets in the believer a new will to obedience by faith.

The command of God, as we learn through Christ is one of love. The Incarnation and the Atonement both attest this fact. The Christian ethic affirms that the basis for good conduct is love. When we love one another we give evidence of our love for God. Through faith in Christ it becomes possible for us to reveal the divine love, and make it real and effective among men. God is not only the source of love in the human heart, but his purpose is best expressed in the command to love. Thus love is the fulfilling of the law. The rule of God is the rule of love, and the Christian ethic seeks to apply the principle of love to the orders of creation.

Brunner believes that it is possible to ascertain to some extent at least what the will of God is in the orders of creation, particularly in the world of human relations. In the third Book of the present volume he discusses the Christian ethic as it affects (1) the individual as related to the community, (2) the community of life as exemplified in marriage and the family, (3) the economic life, (4) political life including the law, (5) the community of culture, and (6) the community of faith, or the church. In working out his concrete counsel in those various relations the author's tendency is to reject anything revolutionary. However, he recognizes the need for change in the existing order, because of the sinfulness of its nature. At the same time the possibility for reformation is very much circumscribed and to work for Utopias is sheer fanaticism. The Christian's first duty is obedience to God, after which comes his obedience to "the powers that be." The general tenor of this part of the work is decidedly conservative. Sin is not so much a matter of wrong choices, many of which could be avoided with a better religious education and background, but a taint of human nature in the Augustinian sense.

This treatise on Christian ethics takes its chief significance in that it defines the field from the definitely Barthian point of view. It parallels the Barthian theology in all fundamental respects. But it gives us comparatively little constructive guidance for solving the bewildering problems of the modern world from the Christian point of view.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

The Philosophy of Religion From the Standpoint of Protestant Theology. Emil Brunner. English Translation by A. J. D. Farrer and Bertram Lee Woolf, in "The International Library of Christian Knowledge." New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937. Pp. 194. $2.25.

A better name for this volume would be *The Philosophy of Religion* from the Standpoint of Barthian Theology. Barthianism is frankly dogmatic in its claims to interpret the Protestant position, and to criticize all who disagree. Yet even in so criticizing there has to be a tacit recognition of other significant views within the stream of Protestant thought. Who knows but that some of the positions criticized may prove to represent the permanent phase of Protestantism better than the theology of crisis does?

This is an important book for it presents its subject-matter in a condensed form, and presents the issue as between the Barthian position and other interpreta-

tions in a clear-cut fashion. In this case the problem is exceedingly difficult, for, as Brunner states it, it is the task "of showing the meaning and justification of religion within the mental grounds known to philosophy." This is difficult because the Christian religion does not get its validity from mental grounds, but from revelation which is a breaking into the stream of life on the part of God. In a sense a philosophy of religion is a contradiction; in another sense it is a branch of theology which is grounded on revelation.

It is the contention of Brunner that many of the philosophies of religion, especially those of the idealistic type, have wrongly assumed that there is a universal essence of religion. This leads them to the attempt to discover parallels between other religions and Christianity. The Barthian stresses the uniqueness of the Christian revelation, through the incarnation, the atonement and the witness of the Holy Spirit. He loves to dwell on the differences, emphasizing his faith that the Christian religion is based on the self-disclosure of God. Any effort to find a unity among religions, no matter what the basis, is doomed to failure. The author is at pains to point out the reasons why such efforts cannot succeed.

The main discussion of the book is in Part II, The Meaning of Revelation. This includes four chapters in which revelation is considered with reference to its bearings on four theories: rationalism, subjectivism, historicism and orthodoxy. Under rationalism there is a short and quite unsatisfactory discussion of the problem of knowledge. Of course, Brunner does not feel the need for an extensive discussion with his doctrine of revelation. He makes no attempt to deal with Schelling's question as to how a human consciousness, itself depraved and atheistic, could receive a divine revelation. In other words revelation is accepted as unexplained and inexplicable. In dealing with the historian, the author makes some penetrating observations. In history we have fragments of meaning, which is to be understood as pieces broken away from the actual meaning. This comes perilously near to that idealism which he has rejected. The whole treatment of history is such as will please nobody but a Barthian. It quite ignores the findings of anthropology, both physical and cultural. By making one's own definition it is always possible to point out discrepancies and irrelevancies in others, such as Brunner does in the case of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Troeltsch, Otto and others. Yet with all his dogmatism, he leaves many of the problems of the philosophy of religion unsolved. The book compares very unfavorably with such a work as Professor Lyman's *The Meaning and Truth of Religion.*

A. Stewart Woodburne.

One Hundred Nuzi Texts; Being the Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research. Vol. XVI, for 1935-1936. Transliterated by Robert F. Pfeiffer, with translation and Commentary by E. A. Speiser. New Haven: Published by the American Schools of Oriental Research. 1936. Pp. xi, 168.

This volume, dedicated to James Alan Montgomery of the University of Pennsylvania in honor of his seventieth birthday, is a most fitting tribute to one who, because of broad and accurate scholarship, sound judgment and a pioneering spirit, has long been one of the foremost Semitic scholars in America. This is a continuation of work opened up by Dr. E. Chiera in 1925 and is an important contribution to scholarship.

The texts, Hurrian (Horite) in origin and coming from the fifteenth century before the beginning of our era, introduce us to the frailties and the foibles of an

ancient, highly developed civilization. Stealing of all kinds of commodities was common. Watering the milk may have brought temporary gain but ultimately met with punishment (pp. 64, 70). Kidnapping was a well-wrought out racket (pp. 63, 67, 73). More than one governor was brought to trial for maladministration of justice and misappropriation of funds, and at least one such was as competent in the appropriation of private and public property and in interlocking crime and politics as the most notorious gangster of modern days. There is not very much new under the sun.

Two appendices and a list of proper names complete this valuable publication.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

A FRESH APPROACH TO THE PSALMS. W. O. E. Oesterley, D. D., Litt. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937. Pp. x, 303. $2.50.

WHILE, as admitted by the author, there is nothing original in the volume (p. ix), thereby disclaiming the intimation of the title, many things of general interest related to the Psalms are herein presented. In the opening chapters the fact is recognized that while in the Hebrew psalms there are unique features, nevertheless, they are part of world literature, Egypt and Babylon producing marked parallels in structure and idea. The dates are then discussed with a definite tendency towards early as against late dating. Sometimes the argument seems unduly forced. It is questionable if from the phrases used in Mark 12:35-37, Luke 20:42, and Hebrews 4:7 one should conclude that "all the Psalms were already ascribed to David (p. 37). Or did the temple worship demand praise in the form of psalms (p. 38)? Did the title "king" exclude Simon from being the hero of some of the Psalms (p. 49)? The thing that cannot happen in logical theory often does happen in history.

Types, and titles of psalms, and music occupy some 85 pages (67-152). Then the use of the psalms in the Synagogue and in the Church (pp. 153-184), is followed by an interpretation of the Messianic psalms (pp. 185-205) and an orderly treatment of the theology of the Psalms (pp. 206-288).

We have in this volume a racy presentation of the most important facts in a great literature that puts within easy reach of every religious leader a wealth of valuable material.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND MYTH. Edwin R. Goodenough, Professor of the History of Religion in Yale University. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1937. Pp. 97. $1.50.

JUDAISM, Greek philosophy, Greek religion and mysticism are interpreted by the author as the four historic sources that have contributed permanent elements to modern Christianity. Judaism emphasized a way of life and the sense of the fatherhood and love of God. Greek philosophy taught Christianity that its faith must be oriented in a world of science, and asserted the reality of virtue and of God, the self-sufficient, changeless existence, which in the logos expressed itself in form, order, beauty and life. Greek religion, through an amazing variety of cults and myths, all of which had an underlying unity, nourished a hope of escape from the dread features of human existence, and promised the larger life, the way back to God. Mysticism, through the idea of the incarnate logos, provided a means whereby

the initiated might experience the great salvation. In these four sources are to be found the universals of religion. This brief, compact volume is a very suggestive interpretation of the essentials in Christianity.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

SOCIETY AND ITS PROBLEMS. Grove Samuel Dow. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1937. Pp. viii, 669. $3.00.

DESPITE the present trend towards mysticism in religion, few who view the matter objectively will fail to see that, for good or ill, religion will in the next few decades be more greatly modified by the social sciences than by any other agency. For this reason anyone with a genuine interest in religion should familiarize himself with what is taking place in these fields.

Among the social sciences more misunderstanding centers around sociology than around any other. Professor Dow in this book, the subtitle of which is "An Introduction to the Principles of Sociology," offers a splendid opportunity for the average reader to become acquainted with the scope, findings and aspirations of sociology.

This book originally came out in 1922 and since then has had 22 printings and four complete revisions. The present revision, prepared by Professor Noel P. Gist, has several new chapters on recent developments in the field. The work, then, commends itself as a cumulative process that should have a lasting value. As any discussion of the vast problems dealt with in the book is out of the question, one can only indicate that Professor Dow takes no doctrinaire attitude. Where issues seem to be open questions, he presents the contentions of the leading protagonists and modestly inserts his own position.

It should also be stated that the work is eminently readable. The author does not suffer from the obsession of so many other sociologists, that above all things sociology must be made to stand out as a science. He is, therefore, at no pains to use "scientific" terminology when his meaning may be made clear by simple English.

GEORGE B. MACDONALD.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE EASTERN CONFLICTS. William Paton, Secretary of the International Missionary Council. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. 1937. Pp. 224. $1.50.

THIS is an extraordinarily good book. It is written with understanding and sympathy, convincing its readers both on account of its comprehensiveness and penetration. Mr. Paton spent several years in India, and before writing the present volume traveled throughout the East, conferring with leaders among nationals as well as missionaries. The situations change so rapidly in the East, that such studies need to be made rather frequently. This study made by Mr. Paton enables us to appreciate the currents that are now flowing, and the problems that are now urgent.

Christianity faces conflicts because of its superior claims. If it were content to take its place as one among many religions, the people of the Orient would tolerate it. But when it claims to be the highest or the final revelation of God, the devotees of other faiths object. Yet the areas of conflict that are most tense today are within the fields of the political and economic. Nationalism, which Edward Shillito has characterized as "man's other religion," and communism which does not hesitate to command the loyalty of the whole man are today testing the endurance and abiding value of Christianity. The point of conflict is thus within the

demands on personal loyalties. When two uncompromising forces make opposing demands, the person or community is called on to make decisions.

The nationalistic spirit has penetrated deeply all through the Orient. The people of India, China and Japan are alike highly conscious of their own integrity. They resent anything that interferes with their own development. The hope of the Christian church in such situations is to conduct itself so that the governments and people will regard the Christian movement as indigenous. If the loyalty of Christians to national aspirations is suspected, then the church is due for obstruction not persecution. In spite of all that can be done, persecutions will come, because Christians cannot compromise where conscience is concerned. It is important that in times of stress they bear witness to the Christian spirit.

It is not possible to review the detailed presentations of this important book. Mr. Paton deals with the conflicts as presented in Japan, China, India, Java and the Near East. In the second part of the book he gives us his "Reflections" on those important problems for which the church must find solutions, as it proceeds with its world task. It would be a great service if Mr. Paton would give us surveys of this kind periodically.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

Missions Tomorrow. Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1936. Pp. xvii, 220. $2.00.

The book represents the cream of thought of one who is especially well informed on Christian missions and thoroughly committed to the missionary enterprise, without apology. There is first a survey of the apparent results in Christian missions thus far, country by country. Then there is a recognition of the new creative forces affecting Christian missions and the maelstrom in which the missionary craft is being driven.

Doctor Latourette speaks frankly of the loss of interest and raises questions regarding the future of Christian missions, giving strong reasons for their continuance and suggesting a program for the new day.

The only question one raises after reading the book, is whether too many aspects of the missionary problem are treated in a single small volume. However, it is *multum in parvo* and is a valuable contribution to missionary literature.

J. H. Franklin.

A Theology for Christian Missions. Hugh Vernon White, Secretary, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. 1937. Pp. xiii, 220. $2.00.

This book proceeds from the hypothesis that the Christian missionary enterprise demands for its sustenance an explicit theology. The Christian missionary today does not encounter an ignorant paganism, but much more often educated non-Christians or enlightened secularism. He requires not only to have a gospel, but a well-integrated system of Christian thought which he can present to the inquiring minds of other faiths. In thus facing the problem, the author clearly passes beyond the "emotional assault." The Christian task is to bring the reality of a living experience of God to bear upon the great problems of life, social and educational as well as religious. The method of friendship reflects the heart of Christianity.

Doctor White has accepted the challenge thrown down by the laymen's inquiry,

especially in the volume *Rethinking Missions.* He accepts as valid their demand that the primary concern of missions be "the good of humanity." Other faiths such as humanism and communism are trying to ground their appeal on their service to human life. It is refreshing to find an author who accepts this criterion, and undertakes to offer a defense of the missionary enterprise from the same point of view. This does not mean that he thereby gives scant attention to theism, for he regards the Christian experience of God as fundamental and believes that the best service to humanity is based on such a faith.

There are other forces proclaiming their ability to save man from the ills from which he suffers today. The most astute rivals of Christianity as ways of salvation are two forms of secularism: nationalism and communism. The author contrasts these two with the Christian claim. Nationalism makes its appeal to man's political needs, communism to his economic needs, and Christianity to the whole man. The Christian doctrine is centered in personality and comprehensive in its scope.

The emphasis of the book on personal experience and on the dynamic of love is wholesome. In the last chapter on "The Conquest of Selfishness" there is a fine summary of this vital point of view. This is a book not only for missionaries and missionary leaders, but for all interested in the Christian message for the world. It is not surprising that it was a selection of the Religious Book Club.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

The New Culture in China. Lancelot Forster, Professor of Education in the University of Hong Kong. With an Introduction by Sir Michael E. Sadler. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company. 1936. Pp. 240. $2.50.

There is no human scene that is changing more rapidly and bristling with greater interest than China. We cannot be too grateful to men like Professor Forster who are living in the midst of Chinese life, and can offer us interpretations such as this. For the present volume displays sympathetic understanding and penetration without which it could not have been successful.

The New Culture in China is illuminating and fascinating. It presents a study in contrasts between the old and the new. The old is personified in Confucius, and the new in Sun Yat-Sen. Confucius instituted a culture that placed classical education at the center, believed in the innate goodness of human nature, practiced tolerance, and sought to develop gentlemen. Sun Yat-Sen is in many respects the father of young China, and sets forth his program in the book *The Three Principles.* The change in progress is symbolized in the burning of Confucius in effigy in 1926, and the noisy enthusiasm that has come to be attached to the tomb of Sun Yat-Sen at Nanking.

Professor Forster indicates the ways in which the new culture in China is borrowing from the West. More especially it is dependent upon America. Europe is more like the old China in its respect for traditions. America strikes a more responsive chord in the new China with its face set toward the future. In the fashioning of a new educational system especially are there signs of China's debt to the United States. The author hopes that the revolution will not go so far that China will lose the values attaching to the classical culture which, after all, produced men of quiet dignity, patience, and respect for others. He believes that China needs a fusion of the old and the new. And he is right. In fact the whole world needs precisely that combination of virility and gentlemanliness.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

None Other Gods. W. A. Visser 't Hooft. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. ix, 185. $1.50.

This little book is a collection of addresses and articles prepared for students in many lands by the secretary of the World's Student Christian Federation. As such, one would expect a marked variety in the various chapters but the opposite is the case. There is so pronounced a uniformity throughout that, but for information to the contrary, we would assume that all the messages were directed to a select, homogeneous group. That the author, addressing himself to groups with diverse interests and backgrounds, offers the same solution to all must not be taken as a lack of sympathy with them, in their immediate problems, but rather that he sees all such problems as symptoms of the same underlying disease—a conflict between ultimates. The cure he describes is the choice of the right ultimate.

For many, his message will be quite satisfactory; for many more—unaccustomed to think as the author does—it will be rather tantalizing.

George B. Macdonald.

We Can Still Believe in God. Allyn K. Foster. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1936. Pp. x, 172. $1.00.

Here is a posthumous publication. It was written by Allyn K. Foster only a few weeks before he answered the Divine summons, and was published afterwards. Therefore, it may not be inappropriate to speak of this volume as the last will and testament, spiritually and intellectually, of one who understood well many of the religious problems of our day and was qualified extraordinarily to deal with them.

Doctor Foster had given himself for some years to working with and for college, university, and seminary students, and perhaps no man among us was more fully aware of intellectual questions confronting many sincerely religious young people. The title reveals the chief characteristic of the book. It is a positive affirmation of faith and not merely a question mark. And the affirmation is supported by impressive statements which are made with a full recognition of the bearings of science, philosophy, and secularism on faith in God. The book has just the right title: *We Can Still Believe in God.*

J. H. Franklin.

The Romance of the Calendar. P. W. Wilson. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1937. Pp. viii, 351. $3.00.

The literary form and the contents of this volume do not belie the arresting title. The story of the origin and development of calendars, Egyptian, Babylonian, Grecian, Roman, Runic, Gregorian, Mayan, Mexican, Polynesian, Indian, Chinese, Jewish, the thirteen-month and the world calendars are all passed in review by one of the facile writers of the day. Weeks, months, years, the Sothic cycle of 1460 years, the precessional cycle of 25,800 years, the earliest known date in history 4241 B. C., the signs of the Zodiac, water-clocks, sun-dials, hemi-cycles, fire-clocks, festivals and facts, ghosts and goddesses, are all marshaled in their scientific and human background, revealing the amazingly accurate observations of the men of long ago and the prevailing superstitions of man today.

The "world calendar" and its values, especially for world comity, are briefly but clearly presented (pp. 267-319). Yet here the chief objectors are the clergy, those guardians of religious rites the world over, who so frequently have confused

the letter of the law with the spirit, and have so often been ready to resist revision of their provincial customs even to bloodshed (pp. 325-327). The objective of the author is praiseworthy, and every page has charm and profit.

I. G. Matthews.

Report of the Inquiry on Cooperative Enterprise in Europe, 1937. Washington: United States Printing Office. 1937. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. Pp. ix, 321. 65 cents.

Cooperatives. Ryllis Alexander Goslin. Headline Book No. 8. New York: Foreign Policy Association. 1937. Pp. 48. Paper, 25 cents; board, 35 cents.

Consumers' Cooperation. Edited by J. G. Brainerd, Ph. D. Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. May, 1937. Pp. xvi, 292.

These are three important additions to the rapidly growing body of literature dealing with the Consumers' Cooperative Movement. The first is the report of the commission of inquiry appointed by the President of the United States to study the enterprise in Europe. The commission consisted of Jacob Baker, Leland Olds, Charles E. Stuart, Robin Hood, Clifford V. Gregory and Emily Cauthern Bates. The report includes three parts and seven appendices. In the first part we have a discussion of the Methods and Relationships of Cooperative Enterprise. This includes an examination of the principles involved, organizational matters, the various types of cooperative enterprise and the relations between consumers' cooperative organizations and such units as the State, Labor and Agriculture. The reading of this section impresses one with the fairness of the inquiry. Repeatedly the pros and cons are set over against one another in an objective fashion. The use of graphs and cartoons helps to make clear the literary exposition.

In the second part the members of the commission act as interpreters, each one describing his or her understanding of The Meaning of Cooperative Enterprise to America. They preferred to write as individuals, but the reader will discover unanimity in that the cooperative movement carries definite significance for American economic problems. It already has made a good beginning in the United States and is bound to expand, since it is meeting real needs.

The third part of this report is an examination of Cooperation at Close Range as seen in some of the more outstanding ventures. Examples are taken from Switzerland, France, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Finland, Sweden, England and Scotland. The appendices add a good deal to this information by summarizing the growth of the movement in the various European countries. Altogether this is an exceedingly useful volume which should be on every reference shelf of cooperative literature.

The Headline Books of the Foreign Policy Association are performing a distinctive service, presenting world issues in graphic style. This volume on Cooperatives is one of the most readable and informing introductions within short compass. We can scarcely commend it too heartily.

When the American Academy of Political and Social Science undertakes to examine any movement, one can depend upon it that it will command the services of the best available experts. This issue dealing with Consumers' Cooperation is no exception. There are no less than twenty-five essays here all from men well-informed. They are classified into five groups, dealing with Principles and Funda-

mentals, Social Relation of Cooperation, Cooperation in the United States, Cooperatives Abroad, and Criticisms.

For the student of this exceedingly important movement these three publications are indispensable. It may be interesting to add that the Spring, 1937, issue of *The Christian Cooperative Fellowship Quarterly* is devoted to the subject, "Why a Religious Interest in the Cooperatives?" The point of view here offered is that this movement is "part of the eternal quest to build a more just and brotherly world-wide kingdom of God on earth."

A. Stewart Woodburne.

The Rise and Growth of English Hymnody. Harvey B. Marks, M. A. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1937. Pp. 288. $2.50.

Concerning this volume, Professor H. Augustine Smith says it is "admirable for fireside reading, rich in values for the pulpit, balanced and accurate for the classroom." In it the development of the hymn is traced from the time of David, to whose religious activities the author has been altogether too generous (pp. 45, 46), up through the Greek and Latin hymn writers, who were stimulated by the doggerel of the heretics, to the latest movements in religious song.

The human interest is preserved throughout and the essential elements in hymnology are judiciously emphasized. The critical evaluation of the "Gospel Songs" of the Moody and Sankey régime is well founded (pp. 204-209). In such collections were a few excellent hymns, but the great majority of them could not qualify. Their appeal had some value in producing mass movements but this must have been superficial and on the whole the "music of the dance hall" is likely to be a liability to the church. The volume might be called the biography of great hymns and as such is profitable and stimulating.

I. G. Matthews.

Religion and Contemporary Psychology. T. H. Pear, Professor of Psychology in the University of Manchester. New York: Oxford University Press. 1937. Pp. 51. 85 cents.

This brochure is the text of the Riddell Memorial Lectures—ninth series—delivered at the University of Durham. The Riddell Memorial Lecturer is expected to deal with the ethics and tenets of Christianity from his standpoint as a specialist. Professor Pear, who is one of the leading British psychologists, disclaims any expert knowledge with reference to Christian beliefs. His method in the three lectures is to choose subjects which are recognized as of concern to the theologian, and to bring together some of the important findings of psychology on those subjects, leaving it to the theologian to gauge their significance for his own field.

The three lectures deal with "The Sense of Reality," "Conscience and Moral Behavior," and "Personal Relationships." Professor Pear draws on the achieved results of the psycho-analysts, the Gestalt psychologists, the social psychologists and the educational psychologists for relevant material. In the first lecture he replies with some extensiveness to the criticisms which Mr. Lawrence Hyde brought against psychologists and sociologists in his book *The Learned Knife*. The results of his discussions for religion are left pretty much to the judgment—or the imagination—of the reader. Probably there will be considerable latitude in the opinions of theologians. At any rate they have here a summary of psychological data with which they must reckon.

A. Stewart Woodburne.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABNORMAL PEOPLE. John J. B. Morgan. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1936. Pp. vii, 605. $3.25.

THIS is the second edition, revised and rewritten, of a book which first appeared in 1928. During the years Professor Morgan's work has served as a good general introduction to the field of abnormal psychology, and has been one of the most popular books designed for classroom discussions. The new edition sets for itself two objectives: to give attention to all significant research since the publication of the first edition, and to increase the clarity of the presentation. In these matters the author has succeeded. Sometimes the additional research material is disappointing, but one can scarcely expect significant advances in every field in a period as short as this.

There are some changes in the captioning of chapters that may be noted. "Benign Mental Disorders" takes the place of "Hysteria"; and "Treatment and Prevention" is the more recent title for "Mental Hygiene." In other respects the organization of material and method of analysis is much as it was in the first edition. It ought to be added that this organization and method is admirably suited to the requirements of the classroom. Professor Morgan deserves to be congratulated and thanked for this excellent new edition of his fine work.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

A HITTITE GLOSSARY. Edgar H. Sturtevant, Professor of Linguistics in Yale University. Second Edition. Philadelphia: Linguistic Society of America. 1936. Pp. 192. $2.75.

THE first edition of this glossary published in 1931 is, according to the preface, already antiquated. When we add to that the fact that the author published a comparative grammar of the Hittite language in 1933 and a Hittite chrestomathy in 1935, we easily recognize not only the contributions Professor Sturtevant is making to Hittite studies, but the splendid progress that is being made therein. The unraveling of the Hittite hieroglyphs is now on a secure foundation. While there is still much to be solved, it is significant that the author hopes that his new edition of the glossary will serve considerably more than five years.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

SOCIAL WORK AS CAUSE AND FUNCTION and Other Papers. Porter R. Lee. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. 270. $2.50.

THE changing attitudes and problems of social work over the last twenty-five years are clearly reflected in this volume of papers by Porter R. Lee of the New York School of Social Work. Two generations ago *charity* was the main drive of social work. It was a *cause* that was essentially an emotional crusade against entrenched evil. Poverty and its allies were to be uprooted. Today charity has given way to social work, which has become a recognized function of the community and a profession. The aim is social welfare.

The techniques are changing. From the older point of view the duty of the social worker was, in the case of the needy family, to outline an ideal plan and compel the members of the family to fit into this as near as possible. Gradually experience and the newer psychology has shown the futility of the older concept. Individuals and families must ultimately work out their own destiny. The force

must come from within, and there must be the widest possible latitude of choice. This, of course, is to be aided with competent guidance, but not dictation.

While Mr. Lee does not venture into the field of religion as such, it is of interest to note the similarity of the changes which have come about in the world of organized religion. The older concept maintained that all truly religious persons must believe in a set of dogmas, rules and assertions, they must exhibit a certain uniform and set pattern of behavior, this pattern being dictated and supervised by the clergy or other approved leaders. This idea is slowly giving way and among the more enlightened churchmen there is the realization of the futility of that approach. No institution, no organization, no set of men has a prior right to chart the way of life. One of the functions of organized religion is to enable man to achieve the good life by helping him to work out his own adjustment to the world and reality as he conceives it. "Work out your own salvation." That this process is to be carried out within a large socially approved framework goes without saying. But dogmatism and dictatorship which have so often characterized even Protestant churches in their attempt to control even the tiniest details of men's lives will some day be looked upon as a ridiculous performance. Respect for personality demands sympathetic insight and cooperation with human beings in their struggle to achieve happiness.

The church is also slowly changing its point of view about the eradication of evils in the community. Thundering pronouncements and challenges from the pulpit, those defiances hurled against sin and iniquity sounded dramatic, sometimes drew big crowds of listeners, and in a few cases were effective—temporarily. But the evils are still here. Crusades against sin have no permanent effect. Only a broad policy of social welfare which looks to a new social order can be ultimately effective.

University of Pennsylvania. Ray H. Abrams.

More World Stories Retold. William James Sly. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1936. Pp. 297. $2.00.

This volume of stories of world interest gives to the parent, teacher, minister, scoutmaster, and librarian a host of classical and non-classical narratives which contain universal appeal. These stories are invaluable for teaching children the fundamental wisdom which is part of our heritage. The book is divided into three parts. Part I contains fairy- and wonder-tales, fables, folk-tales, legends, myths, general and American historical stories, and Bible stories from the Old and New Testaments. Part II includes stories based on purpose and occasion. It embodies missionary and brotherhood stories, and stories for special days. Part III deals with dramatization: the meaning of drama, methods of dramatization, books on the subject and illustrations of story dramatizations. Walter H. Loomis.

Life Eternal. Excerpts from the writings of Bahá 'u 'lláh and 'Abdu'l-Bahá. Compiled by Mary Rumsey Movius. East Aurora, N. Y.: The Roycroft Shops. 1936. Pp. 178. $2.50.

The Bahá'i faith was born about the middle of the nineteenth century in Persia. The founder was Bahá 'u 'lláh who declared his mission in 1863 while an exile in Baghdad. He died in 1892 and appointed as his authorized interpreter and examplar of his teachings, his eldest son 'Abdu'l-Bahá who died in 1921 in Haifa, Palestine.

The principles of the faith are twelve: the oneness of mankind, independent investigation of truth, the foundation of all religions is one, religion must be the cause of unity, religion must be in accord with science and reason, equality between men and woman, prejudice of all kinds must be forgotten, universal peace, universal education, spiritual solution of the economic problem, a universal language and an international tribunal.

This book contains excerpts from the writings of the founder and his son. It will serve as a document of the faith for those who may be interested to know how these principles were enunciated. Few, however, will find more than a luxuriant verbiage of a familiar kind.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON.

THREE TYPICAL BELIEFS. Theodore Gerald Soares, Professor of Ethics, California Institute of Technology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1937. Pp. xiii, 114. $1.50.

THE aim of this book is toward the creation of a better understanding among Roman Catholics, Fundamentalists and Liberals. Unfortunately, indifference and intolerance have combined to keep these groups in ignorance of each other's real beliefs.

Doctor Soares is well equipped by education and experience to present these three distinct points of view with understanding and appreciation. He succeeds in doing this impartially and in terms which will doubtless be acceptable to the adherents of each group.

World Conferences on Faith and Order, held to promote understanding and unity, are of little avail unless they have behind them the sympathetic support of well-informed constituencies. This volume is a valuable contribution to this end.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH: ESSAYS IN EXPLANATION AND DEFENCE. Edited by W. R. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. xi, 340. $3.00.

THE editor of this book continues the tradition of the famous deans of St. Paul's by offering stimulating studies in contemporary religious problems. It is to his credit that he has chosen such a brilliant group of scholars for the task. The book is not a unity in the sense that one view-point prevails, but it achieves a unity of purpose in spite of diverse opinions by defining and clarifying the basic principles of Christianity. The reader will discover a satisfying absence of terms which might make reading tedious and involved.

The range of subjects considered is impressive. Sydney Cave, Principal of New College, London, discusses the reason for Christianity and posits the belief, after a study of comparative faiths, that Christianity has a unique significance "not for the West alone but for the world." The Canon of St. Paul's, J. K. Mozley presents the case for the unity, inspiration and authority of the Bible. Dean Matthews contributes an essay on "The Christian Belief in God" which sets forth the development of the idea from Hebrew times to the present. "The Historical Value of the Gospels" is the hardy perennial of theological controversy offered by Dr. G. S. Duncan of St. Mary's College. "The Christian belief in Christ is in the last resort the affirmation of a spiritual conviction not primarily about Christ, but about God,"

thus does the Bishop of Derby, A. E. J. Rawlinson, begin his discussion of "The Christian Belief in Christ."

Students of religion have argued the claim that St. Paul and not Christ was the real founder of Christianity. They will find this topic succinctly covered by Nathaniel Micklem, Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. Two well-known scholars, J. S. Whale, President of Cheshunt College, and H. Wheeler Robinson, Principal of Regent's Park College, Oxford, ably discuss "Sin and the Need of Redemption" and "The Christian Gospel of Redemption" respectively. An analysis of the institutional aspects of Christianity, entitled "The Church," is presented by Dr. Edwyn Bevan. "Christian Worship" is carefully evaluated in the essay of that name by Francis Underhill, Dean of Rochester. The concluding essays in the volume, one entitled "The Christian Way of Life," by the Canon of Westminster, F. R. Barry, and "Christianity and Civilization," by the late Percy Dearmer, are unforgetable because of the authors' keen penetration into the heart of modern life where a definite yearning for what Christianity has to give is apparent.

The Christian Faith deserves to be read by all who are deeply concerned with the maintenance of a reasonable basis for religious beliefs. A summary of the purpose of the writings may be found in Canon Barry's essay, "It is not the business of the Christian teacher to apologize for Christianity, but to try to tell people what it is. A religion that stands on the defensive is one that has ceased to believe in its own truth" (p. 293).

PAUL M. HUMPHREYS.

RIZAL: MAN AND MARTYR. Frank C. Laubach, A. M., Ph. D. Manila, P. I.: Community Publishers, Inc. 1936. Pp. xvi, 421.

THIS is a fascinatingly written biography of a great soul. José Rizal means to the Filipinos what his contemporary Sun Yat-sen means to the Chinese. He was eminent in so many ways that one needs a battery of superlatives to describe him. But even his greatness as anthropologist, opthalmologist, linguist and so forth is surpassed by his eminence as a patriot. This is the more striking since it did not involve him in hatred and jealousy toward other peoples. It is nothing short of a moral miracle that he was able to preserve such magnanimity toward the Spanish at whose hands he suffered so greatly. It is little wonder that the Filipino people honor and revere their memory of him as they do.

Many critics regard Rizal's novel *Noli Me Tangere* as the greatest novel in half a century. It has been translated into English under the same title and also as *The Social Cancer*. The protests of Rizal against the wickedness of the Spanish friars incurred the anger of the government. After exile and persecution in which all of his family suffered, he was finally condemned to death and was shot at the age of thirty-five.

One of the reasons for Rizal's unpopularity was his liberalism in religion. Though he was devoutly and profoundly religious, he did not let the church do his thinking for him. He preferred to remain a Catholic, and yet the church would not trust him, for to him the only authority in religion was neither Church nor Bible but conscience. His life as well as his tragic death gave him an unusual appreciation of the experience of Jesus at Calvary. Indeed it is impossible to read his life without being reminded of the Galilean whose spirit he had caught to such a great degree. Doctor Laubach deserves our gratitude for giving us this fine insight into Rizal's life and spirit.

A. STEWART WOODBURNE.

REBEL RELIGION. B. C. Plowright. New York: Round Table Press, Inc. 1937. Pp. 195. $2.00.

THE bland assurance of progress and security so optimistically held in the nineteenth century has completely fled the world. In its stead the author finds a great debacle in which three "basic and creative ideas" of that century have been overthrown. Until 1914, the idea of the meaning of life; the idea of Progress and the idea of Democracy were unquestioned. Today, all three rest not upon the solid rock of accepted belief but upon the shifting sand of doubt, if they have not fallen into some abysmal pit.

The author, who is pastor of Queen's Park Congregational Church, Harrow Road, London, W. 10, finds that Christianity or the Christian church is faced with the greatest rival and challenge in Communism. In this secular power, as expressed in Russia, he finds an effort being made to meet the needs of men in which the church has failed.

After five chapters of reviewing the nature of Christianity and contrasting it with the motives and doctrines of Communism, he draws his conclusions in a final chapter entitled Rebel Religion. The sole question, he asserts, concerns principles. "Is Communism a truer expression of Christian principle than our own Western civilization?", this is the one question upon which alone judgment has to be passed. In answering it Christianity in its very nature is found to be committed to the democratic movement. If true to its Founder it must stand squarely with the vast mass of the toilers of the world. The church today is being judged not on theological orthodoxy, or correct observance of religious forms and ceremonies but on obedience and loyalty. Jesus' appeal was not so much to "conversion" as to "obedience." "He made no mention of atonement for sin only." Rather his question was stark and direct: "Will you follow; will you obey?" Certainty is born of obedience. Faith is the practical committal of life to Jesus, not to any belief about him, his work or his person. It is that severely practical note which the church must recover. It should make this question the test of discipleship: "Are you willing to risk everything on the assumption that his way of living is the one true way of life and community?"

Here is the difference between Christianity and Communism of the Russian order. Conditions and situations, remedy and redemption are not to be found without only but within also. The moral release which Christianity offers and provides is what Communism needs. Communism must find a spiritual basis for its material practice and Christianity must find a material expression for its faith in God.

Five things would the author rebel against:

1. Every autocracy seeking impersonal ends.
2. Separation of personality into spirit and body. What affects one affects both.
3. Any evangelism which teaches "get right with God" without getting right with men.
4. Separation of the individual and the community. The greatest foe of religion is not atheism or agnosticism but half religion—secularism within the church which relegates the market-place and the council-chamber to the realm of simply material concerns.
5. Evangelism that dubs social righteousness, secular. That puts God in a moral vacuum.

Though perhaps not revolutionary in its attitude this book rebels against the old and present order and challenges the serious-minded to attempt definite and particular objectives for human welfare.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Lynchburg's Pioneer Quakers and Their Meeting House. Douglas Summers Brown. Lynchburg, Va.: J. P. Bell Company, Inc. 1936. Pp. 180. $1.50.

After reviewing the rise of the Quakers in England under George Fox and analyzing some of their early and later characteristics the author passes to the migration of certain of the Friends to this country. Even before the coming of William Penn to his proprietorship in 1682 many of these "brave, quaint People" had made their homes in America, settling along the seacoast in certain sections from Massachusetts to Virginia.

It was not until late in the first half of the eighteenth century that the Quakers began to move into the present Lynchburg area. But true to their ideals and beliefs "they came unarmed, by covered wagon and ox-cart, trusting in kindness and their own unexcelled bravery to protect them from the savages." In 1754 the first organized, public meeting was established among the new settlers.

The remainder of the story recounts the experiences of these people as they sought to be true to their principles in time of war. They found themselves, in 1776, in the hot-bed of Revolutionary sentiment but, though they believed in the cause of freedom, many refused to take up arms. Many who did break with their religious tenets were disowned. So likewise in the extension of United States territory southwestward and the Civil War. Nevertheless, Quaker folk took active part in organizing and settling the new lands as they were added to the Union.

The book is well illustrated and makes available some original letters and other records for the student of American history. Birth and death records of the South River Meeting Book are also published.

R. E. E. Harkness.

The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918. Elizabeth H. Armstrong. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. xii, 270. Price, $3.00.

The French Canadian, because of his racial qualities, his language and his religion has always constituted a problem in the unification of Canada. When Canada was ceded to Great Britain by the French King in 1763 the population was largely French, but the generous liberal treatment accorded them by the British governors in Canada soon won their allegiance. Nevertheless the demands of the Church, especially, for superior place throughout the entire nation gave the government serious concern. It was the rise of the French Canadian, Wilfrid Laurier, to the premiership of the Dominion that settled these questions and allied the province more closely with the others of more dominant British speech and custom.

Though Quebec has been loyal at home, history would seem to indicate that she has never been whole-heartedly in accord with the imperial consciousness and design of the Dominion. Not only did French Canadians refuse to enlist for service in the Boer War of 1899 but the Province protested against Laurier's proposal in 1910 to aid Britain by contributing naval units, and largely on this policy his administration was defeated. When, however, the World War broke out in 1914 French Canadians universally favored Canada's unreserved participation in it. But within a year, strong opposition arose to further support, and conscription, resorted

to by the Federal Government in 1917, resulted in riots and even discussion of secession.

The view-point of the author is that Quebec looks upon herself as something of a "nation" or a "nationalistic group" within the federation of provinces composing the Dominion but she will not be coerced into alliance with, neither is she greatly interested in, the larger federation of which Canada is a whole is proudly a part—The British Commonwealth of Nations.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Church and State in the Modern World. Henry Pitney Van Dusen, Robert Lowry Calhoun, Joseph Perkins Chamberlain, Henry Sloane Coffin, Samuel McRea Cavert. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. 231. $2.00.

The Rauschenbusch Foundation lectures of the Colgate-Rochester Theological Seminary, for the year 1937, were delivered by five men of outstanding ability in the intellectual world instead of by one as has hitherto been the custom. These men were invited to cooperate in speaking upon this theme of Church and State because of its universal interest at this moment and also for the purpose of developing thought on the subject for discussion at the Oxford Conference on "Church, Community and State."

The five speakers do not agree on all points which is of value in itself. It serves to accentuate the problems that lie before the world in determining what may be the authority of religion in the present nationalistic dominated political order.

Professor Van Dusen, of Union spoke on "Church and State Through Christian History"; Professor Calhoun, of Yale on "Church, State and Human Devotion"; Professor Chamberlain, of Columbia had as his subject "The Mutual Obligations of Church and State"; President Coffin of Union, "Church, State and Community in Education"; and Doctor Cavert, of the Federal Council, "Points of Tension Between Church and State in America Today." The final meeting of the lectureship was a panel discussion participated in by all five speakers which dealt chiefly with the peculiar characteristics of the church and its relationship to all the other interests of life.

These contributions to an understanding, if not a solution, of these acute and perplexing world problems are discriminating and constructive. Each of the first four, perhaps inevitably, reveals, as does Doctor Cavert, the tension between church and state today. Many good men in all lands have found in their hearts a clash of loyalties between their love for their country and their sacrificial devotion to the gospel of Christ.

A criticism which is to be made of each lecture is the evident failure of the speaker to understand clearly the nature of religion. It seems to be looked upon as a concern of the individual quite distinct from all his others, having to do, so far as Christians are considered, with loyalty to the will of God as revealed through Jesus Christ. Thus religion for the western world is adherence to the doctrine and faith of the church. Religion in its universal aspect as man's effort to master his entire world and enjoy life's fullest opportunities and potentialities has never been glimpsed.

This failure to understand religion in the history of man tends to prevent a true understanding of the relationship of state and church. In early history the state controlled religion because the state considered itself responsible for providing

for the complete welfare of each citizen. When at any time the individual protested he was forced to submit or die. It was only when democracy arose that separation of church and state became possible and a reality. For when the people successfully declared that government derived from themselves, that they controlled the instruments of their own well-being, then automatically they were free religiously. Every true democracy must enjoy separation of church and state, but in a democracy only is that separation possible of attainment.

This fundamental fact the lectures seem not to have grasped.

R. E. E. Harkness.

The Separation of Church and State in Italian Thought from Cavour to Mussolini. S. William Halperin. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1937. Pp. 115. $2.00.

In the discussion of this present urgent question of the relationship of Church and State it is helpful to have this concise but thorough study of the subject in its historic and most significant setting. From it we clearly discern the intricate problems that arise and the diverse views of honest and sincere men.

In the post-Napoleonic years the Catholic Church became supreme in the peninsula. By the Piedmontese code of 1837 it was "elevated to juridical parity with the state." Following the revolutions of 1848, however, a reaction set in and liberals demanded that the state be set free from such "an anachronistic and anomalous partnership." Chief among these leaders was Cavour, the great statesman who had been influenced by the liberal thought of England, France and Switzerland, in each of which he had sojourned. His slogan became "A free church in a free state." He declared himself in favor of that separation which existed in the United States—"a separation which I regard as an inevitable consequence of the progress of civilization and an indispensable condition of the well-being of societies ruled by the principle of freedom."

Cavour found himself opposed by anti-ecclesiastical politicians who firmly believed that the state must be given control of the church. Rather than separation, the church must be made subordinate to the political powers in order that the clerics as other citizens might be subject to the law of the land. On the other hand he was fought by the church which declared its divine right and insisted that separation would lead inevitably to atheism.

With the beginning of the twentieth century and the ascension of Pope Pius X to the Papal throne in 1903 a new era was ushered in. More friendly relations were established between the two powers. Francesco Ruffini, influenced by this new feeling of good-will, though a disciple of Cavour, opposed complete separation. The state must not be robbed of its authority over the church and the supervision of properly educated priests.

Luzzatti, 1909, expressed his views in the formula: free religion in the sovereign state. The church must live with the state and conform to its laws. Bonomelli, Bishop of Cremona, appealed for separation on the basis that "The unfortunate and fatal quarrel between church and state, between religion and country, was encouraging many Italians in the erroneous belief that it was impossible to be at one and the same time good patriots and good Catholics." Such a heresy brought down upon his head the ire of the Pontif.

This was the situation at the outbreak of the war, during which period there

was peace at home. Fascism, however, recognized at once the value of the church in creating a totalitarian state. Though Mussolini urged the closer union there were some who still opposed. Fasulo argued that "in those countries where a certain faith received official recognition and support, religion tended to sink to a very low level and become an instrument of class exploitation. On the other hand, wherever separation had been enforced, religion betrayed no symptoms of decline." Orestano, supporting Fascism, took the position that "The greatness of the Papacy is before all else Italian greatness." Other protagonists placed the church above all public law, occupying a sphere all its own. So with the rise of the totalitarian state, separatism was doomed. "The church was to be the ally of the state, not its rival. It was to share power, not usurp it. And, in the end, a common purpose would be served, to the greater glory of the Italian state and people." But toleration of other than the Catholic faith was secured.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Pages from an Oxford Diary. Paul Elmer More. Princeton University Press. 1937. $1.50.

This is the final confession of faith by Paul Elmer More. In the quiet hours of Oxford nights, under the spell of those monastic portals and colleges built by men in the search of God, he penned it. And it is good.

The existence of God cannot be proved and all efforts so to do seem but nonsense. All arguments concerning the absolute are empty. God is a person, if there be a God and if belief in him is to be of value to men. Thus the author after long years of search is content to think of him, and although the argument from design has its many weaknesses, yet in a modified form it lays the groundwork upon which he rests the strength of his faith. Deity and "Person" he refuses to define, but he insists upon the fact of a Power that makes for righteousness.

At the same time the fact of evil is accepted—logically so. The dualism he does not deny. Plato's "Necessity" is reasonable; the Incarnation is the manifestation of that righteous-working Power in human form, meeting with evil and yet somehow wresting from it that which is good.

But perhaps these pages have value, much otherwise than the author expected. Not in the reasonableness of a faith in a God, but in the assurance that in goodness, love and graciousness is contentment, peace, and a sense of righteousness to be found. Whether there be a God or not, whether there be "continuation" of life or not, nobility, integrity, courtesy here and now give life meaning and joy.

R. E. E. Harkness.

The Validity of Religious Experience. Albert C. Knudson. The Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 237. $2.00.

Since the beginning of the Evangelical Revival two centuries ago, according to Dean Knudson, "religious experience has been a subject of unceasing interest." For, since that time "experience has become the chief test of religious as well as scientific truth." But what is the basis of the validity of this experience?

In these five Fondren Lectures delivered at the Southern Methodist University, February, 1937, the author seeks to "clarify thought" in answer to that question.

Rightly he refuses to find it in the "immediacy" of the mystic, for the objectivity of such an experience is as dubious as that of sense. Moreover, such an experience is always "conditioned by subjective factors and by antecedent belief."

The value argument of the pragmatist is also rejected, though it commands consideration. The pragmatist equates truth with utility but in so doing he destroys truth, since an erroneous belief might well yield beneficial results.

The conclusion is that the validity of religion is in its own self-verification. "It is, then, in the religious nature of man . . . that religious experience finds its justification. It validates itself." Implicit confidence may be placed "in the essential trustworthiness of our own nature."

So far a student of religion may find himself in agreement with Dean Knudson if by religion he means what he says at one point: "It seeks to promote well-being as a whole. Its aim is fullness of life. Its values are as broad as human need and human capacity." But the author's conclusions are unfounded if it is true, as he elsewhere insists, that, "religious experience involves reference to a more-than-human object." "Religious experience" always has been and "will continue to be an experience of God."

In the first place the student of the history of religions cannot accept that statement. Its lack of exactness should be manifest by the author's own reputed test: "We learn what is essential and normative in the religious nature of man only by a critical study of the religions of the world." Primitive religions and many of the great religions of today do not warrant such a conclusion.

In the second place there can be no verification of belief in the existence of God or of the experience of fellowship with him. The same arguments hold true here as in the case of the mystic. Such an experience is by faith alone. But there is the self-verification of a profound satisfaction in religion as a search for the fullness of life. It is true, there is a way of life which justifies itself as the only way in which the individual and the world may find that rich reward of an answer to their deepest needs.

In conclusion we cannot escape the feeling that these lectures are in large measure an apologetic for the teaching and views of John Wesley.

R. E. E. Harkness.

BOOK NOTICES

MINISTER'S SERVICE BOOK FOR PULPIT AND PARISH USE. Compiled and Edited by James Dalton Morrison. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. 1937. Pp. xv, 268. $1.50.

THIS volume has been compiled and edited by the gifted minister of the Central Baptist Church, Providence, Rhode Island. It is exceedingly well done, bringing within the compass of a convenient volume prayers, orders of worship, calls to worship (including those for special days) and liturgical forms for various occasions. The selection of Scripture lessons, poems and prayers for use in the sick-room, and at funeral services is wise. We predict a fine reception for this book from men in the ministry.

THE SUPERINTENDENT WANTS TO KNOW. Oscar P. Campbell, Director of Christian Education, Connecticut Baptist Convention. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1937. Pp. 81. 30 cents.

THE American Baptist Publication Society adds another brief book in the series under the general editorship of Dr. John W. Elliott dealing with the work of the church school. This is a handbook intended for the layman serving as superintendent. It deals briefly and pointedly with questions the superintendent wants answered, and is an effective guide to the functions pertaining to that office.

FIFTH AVENUE SERMONS. John Sutherland Bonnell. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1936. Pp. 229. $1.50.

THOUGH delivered at Fifth Avenue, these sermons may be applied anywhere. They are worthy of that great pulpit, and explain why Doctor Bonnell is so universally acclaimed as one of the best present-day preachers. The sermons cover a wide variety of subjects and are interestingly put together.

THE TENT AND THE SKY. Avery A. Shaw. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1936. Pp. 126. $1.00.

MOST of these sermons are chapel talks and one is a baccalaureate sermon. The human interest element so characteristic of the volume is largely maintained by the use of fresh illustration and poetic quotation.

YOUR MONEY AND YOUR LIFE, and Other Sermons. Whitney S. K. Yeaple. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1937. Pp. 150. $1.00.

THIS is another volume in The Judson Press series by the versatile minister of the Lake Avenue Church, Rochester, N. Y. These sermons enable the reader to appreciate why Doctor Yeaple's ministry is so fruitful.

THE RELIGION OF LIFE FORCE. R. Edison Page. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Incorporated. 1937. Pp. 95. 75 cents.

THE thesis of this volume is that the Life Force is the maker of the world, and that we are the Life Force growing conscious of itself, and gradually mastering other forces. It is a very simple philosophy of life—too simple for this complex age.

MEDITATIONS Suggested by Biblical and Other Poetry. Laura H. Wild, Professor of Biblical Literature, Mount Holyoke College. New York: Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 150. $1.00.

THIS is a group of five meditations gathering around themes taken from nature. The play of the imagination in symbolism has always been a great contributor to religious inspiration. Miss Wild has made a collection of biblical and other poetical selections of rare beauty. It will serve the needs of many who desire aid for devotion of the richest kind.

THE SECRET OF HIS PRESENCE. L. M. Bratcher. Nashville: Broadman Press. 1937. Pp. 178. $1.50.

THIS is the story of the conversion, the call and labors of a Baptist missionary in Brazil. It is strictly a missionary book, but is arranged in a unique manner and agreeably written. Something of the varied experiences of one who has discovered the "Secret of His Presence" is found in every chapter.

OUR LORD: AN AFFIRMATION OF THE DEITY OF CHRIST. Wm. Childs Robinson, A. M., Th. D. (Harv.), D. D. Professor of Historical Theology, Columbia Theological Seminary, Decatur, Georgia. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1937. Pp. 238. $2.00.

THE nature of the volume is indicated by the title.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PAUL. Paul Sevier Minear. Department of New Testament Literature, Garrett Biblical Institute. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 82. 40 cents.

AN unpretentious but interestingly written little book intended for teachers in church schools. The contents are arranged under the following headings: Meeting Paul, Accompanying Paul; Photographs of Paul; Faith, Hope, and Love; Paul's Legacy. In addition are a chronological summary, selected biographies, and references and suggestions for study.

A HANDBOOK FOR CHURCH RECREATION LEADERS. T. B. Matson. Nashville: The Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention. 1937. Pp. 158. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

THIS book is to be used as a basis for a Baptist Training Union Administration Course in recreational leadership. The first part discusses general principles such as the Bible and play, reasons for the church program of play, and ideals for the social life of a church; the latter part is more specific, dealing with the planning and the directing of various types of socials. A bibliography and a list of selected games are appended. For one who is unacquainted with the field, this will serve as an introduction to recreational leadership in the church.

JUNIOR BOYS WRITE THEIR LIFE OF CHRIST. By William Grimc. Boston: Manthorne and Burack, Inc. 1936. Pp. 97. $1.00.

THE idea of having junior boys and girls write their own life of Christ is a splendid one, for it not only encourages their efforts at creative work, but will also be sure to make the story of the Greatest Hero who ever lived more real. This book describes the experiment carried on in an Episcopal Church and so the material

chosen was selected from the Book of Common Prayer and follows very closely the Episcopal church year.

THE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHURCH. Robert Cashman. New York and Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co. 1937. Pp. 163. $1.50.

MR. CASHMAN is business manager of the Chicago Theological Seminary. His book is just what the title indicates, and leaves little unsaid as to the details of the business side of the church, from the minister's office, to church finance and general executive leadership. It is a timely book, and one which few ministers ought to neglect.

THE EVANGELISTIC SPIRIT AND THE LAYMAN'S TASK. J. Russell Throckmorton. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. 1937. Pp. 64. Paper back, 25 cents.

THIS booklet is designed as a text for the study of laymen interested in the task of evangelism. As such it covers the field adequately, and sanely, hence is commended for study groups and for the minister who would refresh himself for this important work.

FIELDS OF SERVICE IN THE CHURCH. J. L. Corzine. Nashville: The Sunday School Board of the Southern Baptist Convention. 1936. Pp. 190. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

THE author writes for young people, and with the purpose of enlisting them in the service of the church. For the sectarian it is well adapted, but it is too Baptistic for general use.

FELLOWSHIP WITH THE FATHER. Elisabeth Hamill Davis. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1936. Pp. 269. $1.50.

WITH a fine sense of the beautiful and the inspired, Miss Davis has collected here a volume of prayers. They are gathered under the days of the recurring months, often a number for each day. As an aid to private and public devotion it can scarcely be excelled. It might well have borne the title, "A Selection of the World's Great Prayers."

MORE TWO MINUTE STORIES. Carl S. Patton. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co. 1937. Pp. 130. $1.25.

THESE stories are so attractively and simply told that it is little wonder the boys and girls "listened and still came back for more." Each one is a gem. They make excellent children's sermons.

THE INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES. Loraine Boettner. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1937. Pp. 88. $1.00.

THIS volume is written to prove the theory of verbal inspiration. The author is so zealous in his effort to accomplish this end that he gives little attention to the problems uncovered by the historical study of the Scriptures, and is led into specious argument in endeavoring to explain alleged errors in the Bible. An uncharitable attitude is taken toward those who do not agree with the writer, so that the reader is likely to receive the impression that in defending the letter, the spirit has been overlooked.

BOOKS RECEIVED

PSALMS OF THE MODERN LIFE. Walter Taylor Field. Boston: Christopher Publishing House. 1937. Pp. 48. $1.25.

LUKE, FIRST CENTURY CHRISTIAN. Graham Chambers Hunter. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. xx, 170. $2.00.

REPORTS PREPARED BY THE COMMISSION ON THE CHURCH'S UNITY IN LIFE AND WORSHIP FOR THE WORLD CONFERENCE ON FAITH AND ORDER, Edinburgh, 1937. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937.

A DECADE OF OBJECTIVE PROGRESS IN CHURCH UNITY, 1927-1936. H. Paul Douglass. Pp. xxii, 140. $1.50.

THE MEANINGS OF UNITY. Angus Dun. Pp. viii, 50.

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS. Gaius Jackson Slosser. Pp. vii, 49.

THE NON-THEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF CHURCH UNION. Willard Learoyd Sperry. Pp. vii, 50.

NEXT STEPS ON THE ROAD TO A UNITED CHURCH. William Adams Brown. Pp. vi, 48.

SONGS OF VICTORY. B. B. McKinney, Editor. Nashville: Sunday School Board of Southern Baptist Convention. 1937. Pp. 514. 25 cents.

HUDIBRAS IN THE BURLESQUE TRADITION. Edward A. Richards. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. x, 184. $2.50.

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MODERN WORLD. Henry Pitney Van Dusen, Robert Lowry Calhoun, Joseph Perkins Chamberlin, Henry Sloane Coffin, Samuel McCrae Cavert. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. x, 231. $2.00.

THE CIVILIZED MIND. Lynn Harold Hough. New York: Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 246. $2.00.

THE HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY. Johannes Weiss. New York: Wilson-Erickson, Inc. 1937. Two Volumes xii, 877. $10.00.

PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION. Gottfried Von Haberler. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. xv, 363. $2.00.

WAR AND PEACE. Bulletin III of the International Relations Committee of the National Council of the Teachers of English. Ida T. Jacobs, Chairman. Chicago National Council of the Teachers of English. 1937. Pp. xv, 76. 25 cents.

SOCIAL GROWTH. Gerald McMahan. New York: Galleon Press, Inc. 1937. Pp. 154.

WAR MADNESS. Stephen and Joan Rausenbush. Washington: National Home Library Foundation. 1937. Pp. 190. 25 cents.

BOYS AND GIRLS LEARNING ABOUT ALCOHOL. Margaret Skidmore and Carolyne LaGrange Brooks. New York: Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 166. $1.00.

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICAN TRIBES. Fred Eggan, Editor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1937. Pp. xvii, 456. $3.00.

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER. B. F. Winkelman. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co. 1937. Pp. viii, 310. $1.50.

CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY. Leland E. Hinsie, M. D. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. xii, 199. $2.75.

BANQUETS. Alene Harris. Nashville: Broadman Press. 1937. Pp. 130. $1.00.

Yearbook of American Churches, 1937. H. C. Webber, Editor. Association Press. 1937. Pp. vi, 193. $2.00.

The Problem of Art. Canon Peter Green. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1937. Pp. xvi, 218. $2.50.

The Ministry and the Sacraments. R. Dunkerley and A. C. Headlam, Editors. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. Pp. ix, 560. $5.00.

International Institutions and World Peace. S. D. Myers, Jr., Editor. Dallas: The Arnold Foundation, Southern Methodist University. 1937. Pp. xii, 290.

An Introduction to the New Testament. Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1937. Pp. xvii, 362. $2.50.

The Study of the Bible. Ernest Cadman Colwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1937. Pp. xi, 186. $2.00.

Christianity and Communism. H. Wilson Harris, Editor. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. 1937. Pp. xiv, 77. $1.50.

A History of Christian Worship. Oscar Hardman. Nashville: Broadman Press. 1937. Pp. 263. $2.00.

Christian Faith and the Science of Today. J. H. Morrison. Nashville: Broadman Press. 1937. Pp. vii, 228. $2.00.

The Doctrine of the Work of Christ. Sydney Cave. Nashville: Broadman Press. 1937. Pp. 317. $2.50.

Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation. Peter Halman Monsma. Somerville, New Jersey: Somerset Press, Inc. 1937. Pp. 218. $2.00.

Books that Have Shaped the World. Fred Eastman. Chicago: American Library Association. 1937. Pp. 62. $1.00.

Handbook of Southern Baptist Convention. E. P. Allredge. Nashville: Sunday School Board Southern Baptist Convention. 1937. Pp. 394. 50 cents.

The Future of Christianity. Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: Abingdon Press. 1937. Pp. 158. $1.50.

A History of the Expansion of Christianity. Volume I. The First Five Centuries. Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1937. Pp. xxiv, 412. $3.50.

The Test of the Nationality of a Merchant Vessel. Robert Rienon. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. 247. $2.75.

Ministerial Training in Eighteenth Century New England. Mary Latimer Gambrell. New York: Columbia University Press. 1937. Pp. 169. $2.50.

Ethical Dilemmas of Ministers. Frederick F. Mueller and Hugh Hartshorne. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1937. Pp. 250. $2.00.

A Church Using Its Sunday School. J. N. Barnette. Nashville: Sunday School Board of Southern Baptist Convention. Pp. 178. Cloth, 60 cents; paper, 40 cents.

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